Quantum Algorithms for Boolean Equation Solving and Quantum Algebraic
  Attack on Cryptosystems by Chen, Yu-Ao & Gao, Xiao-Shan
ar
X
iv
:1
71
2.
06
23
9v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
6 A
ug
 20
18
Quantum Algorithms for Boolean Equation Solving
and Quantum Algebraic Attack on Cryptosystems∗
Yu-Ao Chen1,2 and Xiao-Shan Gao1,2
1KLMM, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
2University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
Email: xgao@mmrc.iss.ac.cn
August 7, 2018
Abstract
Decision of whether a Boolean equation system has a solution is an NPC problem and finding
a solution is NP hard. In this paper, we present a quantum algorithm to decide whether
a Boolean equation system F has a solution and to compute one if F does have solutions
with any given success probability. The runtime complexity of the algorithm is polynomial
in the size of F and the condition number of F . As a consequence, we give a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm for solving Boolean equation systems if their condition numbers are
small, say polynomial in the size of F . We apply our quantum algorithm for solving Boolean
equations to the cryptanalysis of several important cryptosystems: the stream cipher Trivum,
the block cipher AES, the hash function SHA-3/Keccak, and the multivariate public key
cryptosystems, and show that they are secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the
condition numbers of the corresponding equation systems are large. This leads to a new
criterion for designing cryptosystems that can against the attack of quantum computers:
their corresponding equation systems must have large condition numbers.
Keywords. Quantum algorithm, Boolean equation solving, polynomial system solving,
HHL algorithm, condition number, stream cipher Trivum, block cipher AES, hash function
SHA-3/Keccak, MPKC.
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1 Introduction
As a major advance in quantum algorithm, Harrow, Hassidim, and Lloyd (HHL) proposed a
quantum algorithm to solve a linear system Ax = |b〉 with complexity polynomial in logN , s,
κ, and 1/ǫ, where N , s, κ are respectively the dimension, the sparseness, the condition number
of A, and ǫ is the precision of the output. The HHL algorithm can be exponentially faster than
classic algorithms if s and κ are small. Ambainis gave a new version of the HHL algorithm whose
complexity is optimal in κ [2]. Childs, Kothari, and Somma gave a new quantum algorithm for
linear equation solving, which exponentially improves the dependence on the precision [13].
In this paper, based on the HHL algorithm, a quantum algorithm for Boolean equation
solving will be given with complexity polynomial in the size of the input equation system and
∗ Partially supported by NSFC grants no. 11688101, no. 11101411.
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the condition number of certain matrix derived from the equation system. Solving Boolean
equations is a fundamental problem in theoretical computer science. Decision of whether a
Boolean equation system has a solution is an NPC problem and finding a solution is NP hard.
Our algorithm can be as much as exponentially faster than traditional algorithms for these NP
hard problems under certain conditions.
1.1 Main results
Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} be a set of Boolean polynomials in variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} and with
total sparseness TF =
∑r
i=1#fi, where #fi is the number of terms in fi. Then, we have
Theorem 1.1. For ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there is a quantum algorithm which decides whether F = 0 has
a solution and computes one if F = 0 does have solutions, with probability at least 1 − ǫ and
runtime (gate) complexity O˜((n3.5 + T 3.5F )κ
2 log 1/ǫ), where O˜ suppresses more slowly-growing
logarithm terms and κ is the condition number of the Boolean polynomial system F (refer to
Theorem 5.8 for definition).
As a consequence, we can solve Boolean equation systems using quantum computers with
any given success probability and in polynomial-time if the condition number κ of F and the
sparseness TF of F are small, say when κ and TF are poly(n). Since TF is the size of the input to
the algorithm, it should be small for practical problems. For instance, all the equation systems
from cryptanalysis in Section 6 are very sparse. Therefore, the key factor is the condition number.
As a consequence, we give a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving Boolean equation
systems if their condition numbers are small, say the condition numbers are poly(n, TF ).
Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ C[X] be a set of polynomials with complex numbers as coefficients
and with total sparseness TF =
∑r
i=1#fi. A solution a for F = 0 is called Boolean, if each
coordinate of a is 0 or 1. Clearly, deciding whether F has a Boolean solution is NPC. We also
give a quantum algorithm to compute Boolean solutions of F .
Theorem 1.2. For ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there is a quantum algorithm which decides whether F = 0 has
a Boolean solution and computes one if F = 0 does have Boolean solutions, with probability at
least 1 − ǫ and runtime complexity O˜(n2.5(n + TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ), where κ is the condition number
of the polynomial system F (refer to Theorem 4.3 for definition).
Theorem 1.2 is a more basic result. Theorem 1.1 follows from Theorem 1.1 using a novel
reduction, and much more problems such as optimization over finite fields [10] can also be
efficiently reduced to Theorem 1.2.
We apply Theorem 1.1 to cryptanalysis of several important cryptosystems. As early as
in 1946, Shannon [32] pointed out insightfully that “Construct our cipher in such a way that
breaking it is equivalent to solving a certain system of simultaneous equations in a large number
of unknowns.” We know that the analysis of many cryptosystems, such as the stream cipher
Trivum, the block cipher AES, the hash function SHA-3/Keccak, and the multivariate public
key cryptosystems (MPKC), can be reduced to solving Boolean equations. Note that all these
cryptosystems are important. AES is an NIST standard since 2001 [16], Trivium is an inter-
national standard under ISO/IEC 29192-3, and Keccak [6] is the latest member of the Secure
Hash Algorithm family of standards, released by NIST in 2015.
In Table 1, we give the complexities of using Theorem 1.1 to perform quantum algebraic
attack to these cryptosystems, where κ is the condition number of the corresponding Boolean
equation systems, T is the total sparseness of the Boolean equations, and c is the complexity
constant of the Harrow-Hassidim-Lloyd (HHL) algorithm (see Remark 2.4 for definition). For
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Cryptosystems Nk Nr #Vars #Eqs T Complexity
AES-128 4 10 4288 10616 252288 273.30cκ2
AES-192 6 12 7488 18096 421248 276.59cκ2
AES-256 8 14 11904 29520 696384 278.53cκ2
Trivium 1152 3543 4407 24339 261.71cκ2
Trivium 2304 6999 9015 49683 265.38cκ2
Nh Nr #Vars #Eqs T Complexity
Keccak 384 24 76800 77160 611023 278.25cκ2
Keccak 512 24 76800 77288 611540 278.25cκ2
Table 1: Complexities of the quantum algebraic attack
AES-m, m = 32Nk is the key bit-length and Nr is the number of rounds. For Trivium, Nr is the
number of rounds. For Keccak, Nh is the output size, Nr is the number of rounds, and the state
bit-size b is 1600. From Table 1, we can see that these cryptosystems are secure under quantum
algebraic attack only if the condition numbers of their corresponding equation systems are large.
This leads to a new criterion for designing cryptosystems that can against the attack of quantum
computers: their corresponding equation systems must have large condition numbers. Condition
numbers for equation systems are generally difficult to estimate, and estimating the condition
numbers for these cryptosystems is an interesting future work.
Many problems from computational theory and cryptography can be reduced to finding a
Boolean solution for certain polynomial systems. In this paper, we use Theorem 1.2 to three such
problems: the 3-SAT problem, the subset sum problem, and the graph isomorphism problem.
1.2 Technical contribution
The main idea of the quantum algorithm proposed in this paper is that the solutions of a
Boolean equation system can be obtained by solving a linear system with the HHL quantum
algorithm [23]. For a linear system Ax = |b〉, the HHL algorithm can obtain an approximation
to the solution state |x〉 exponentially faster than classic algorithms under certain conditions.
Precisely, our algorithm has three main steps:
Step 1 Let F ⊂ C[X] have a finite number of solutions: a1, . . . ,aw. A pseudo solution of F
is defined to be a linear combination of monomial solutions of F , that is, ∑wi=1 cim˜(ai),
where m˜ is a vector of monomials in X up to certain degree and ci are complex numbers.
We show that a pseudo solution of F can be computed by solving a linear system with the
HHL algorithm (see section 3).
Step 2 For F ⊂ C[X], we show that Boolean solutions for F can be computed from the pseudo
solutions of F obtained in Step 1 with high probability (see section 4).
Step 3 The problem of solving a Boolean equation system is reduced to the computation of the
Boolean solutions for a 6-sparse polynomial system over C (see section 5). A polynomial
system H is called k-sparse if each polynomial in H contains at most k terms.
We will explain each of these steps briefly.
First, we show how to compute the pseudo solutions for a polynomial system. Let F =
{f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ C[X] with di = deg(fi), TF =
∑r
i=1#fi, and D a positive integer greater than
maxi di. Consider all the polynomials mjfi, where mj are monomials with deg(mj) ≤ D − di.
These equations mjfi = 0 can be written as a linear system MF ,DmD = bF ,D, where mD is the
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set of all the monomials m with deg(m) ≤ D and bF ,D is the set of the constant terms in mjfi.
The linear system MF ,DmD = bF ,D is called the Macaulay linear system1 and MF ,D is called
the Macaulay matrix of F . Our contributions here are in three aspects. We propose the concept
of complete solving degree and show that for such a degree D, the monomial solutions for F
can be obtained from MF ,DmD = bF ,D. We also give a nice upper bound for complete solving
degree of the polynomial system occurred in computing the Boolean solutions. It is shown that
by using the HHL algorithm to MF ,DmD = bF ,D, we obtain a pseudo solution for F . We gave
a modified HHL algorithm to solve the Macaulay linear system, which has better complexities
than using the original HHL algorithm.
Second, we show how to compute Boolean solutions for a polynomial system F over C, which
are the solutions of F1 = F ∪ {x21 − x1, . . . , x2n − xn} over the field of complex numbers. Our
contribution here is to show that the solutions of F1 = 0 can be obtained from the pseudo
solutions of F1 = 0 with high probability by combining the property of quantum states and that
of Boolean solutions. The novelty of the approach is that the error bound for the solutions in
the HHL algorithm is used to give the probability for finding Boolean solutions of F .
Thirdly, let F be a Boolean polynomial system in variables X. Since the HHL algorithm works
over C and does not work for finite fields, we cannot use the HHL algorithm to the Macaulay
linear system of F . We prove that the solutions to F are the same as the Boolean solutions of
a 6-sparse polynomial system F2 ⊂ C[X,U] for some extra indeterminates U. Furthermore, the
numbers of variables in U and the numbers of equations in F2 are linear in the size of F . By
computing the Boolean solutions of F2, we find the solutions of F = 0.
1.3 Comparing with existing work
The idea of reducing nonlinear polynomial systems to linear systems of monomials can be traced
back to the classical work on resultants [27], which give conditions for the existence of common
solutions for over-determined polynomial systems. Here, a key concept is the solving degree.
Precisely, D is a solving degree of polynomial system F , if the Gro¨bner basis of (F) can be
obtained by using Gaussian elimination to the Macaulay linear system MF ,DmD = bF ,D. Lazard
[26] and more recently Caminata-Gorla [7] gave nice upper bounds for the solving degree for
projective zero dimensional polynomial ideals. The F4 algorithm [18] and the XL [14] algorithm
were proposed to compute the Gro¨bner basis based on this idea. Since the Macaulay linear
system for a polynomial system with multiple roots are under-determined, it is not possible to
solve the polynomial system by computing values of the monomials directly, unless the equation
system has a unique solution. In the general case, extra work need to be done, such as to reduce
polynomial system solving to the computation of eigenvalues or solving of univariate equations
[15, p51].
In this paper, we show that the solving degree is not big enough for monomial solving from
the Macualay linear system. Instead, we propose the concept of complete solving degree which
is enough to for monomial solving from the Macaulay linear system. Furthermore, we show that
the Boolean solutions of a polynomial system can be found directly from the solutions of the
Macaulay linear system in the quantum case.
Our algorithm is based on the HHL algorithm for solving the linear system Ax = |b〉, where
A ∈ CN×N , x, b ∈ CN . The speedup achieved in our algorithm is based on the exponential
speed up of the HHL algorithm for solving sparse linear systems. On the other hand, the HHL
algorithm has the following subtle properties.
1The Macaulay linear system in Section 3.1 is more complicated than the one given here, although they are
essentially the same. Here, we use this simple version to explain the ideas.
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1. The algorithm does not give a solution to Ax = |b〉, but a state |x〉 = (x1, . . . , xN ).
Measuring of |x〉 gives |x1| : |x2| : · · · : |xN | and the complexity will increase to O(N).
2. The algorithm gives an answer |x〉 even if A|x〉 = |b〉 has no solutions.
3. The algorithm works over C, but not over finite fields.
Our algorithm does not have these limitations and gives an exact solution to the Boolean system.
For instance, finding the Boolean solutions to a linear equation with integer coefficients is an NP
hard problem (Section 4.3), which can be solved by our algorithm but not the HHL algorithm.
So our algorithm can be considered a significant extension of the HHL algorithm.
It is interesting to see that the second “drawbacks” of the HHL algorithm mentioned above
is used to generate the quantum state |b〉 efficiently (see Lemma 2.8) for the Macaulay linear
system. The HHL algorithm assumes that |b〉 is given. In the general case, there exist no efficient
algorithms to generate |b〉 from b [1] and efficient generation for |b〉 can be achieved only in some
special cases [9]. Fortunately, in our case, b = bF ,D is very sparse: at most r entries of b are
nonzero, which leads to an efficient generation for |b〉 and the complexity is negligible comparing
to that of the HHL algorithm.
The complexity of our algorithm contains the condition number of the Boolean polynomial
system, which is the condition numbers of the Macaulay matrixes of the polynomial systems and
is inherited from the HHL algorithm. It was proved in [23] that the dependence on condition
number cannot be substantially improved. More precisely, it was shown that if a quantum
algorithm exists for matrix inversion running in time O(κ1−δpoly(log(N)) for some δ > 0, then
BQP =PSPACE [23]. Although the condition numbers of generic polynomial systems are
usually exponential, the polynomial systems to be solved in our problems (refer to sections
4.3, 5.3, 6) are highly structural, which are super sparse in most cases and always include the
“Boolean equations” x21−x1, . . . , x2n−xn. It is expected that new methods are needed to estimate
the condition numbers for these polynomial systems.
Previous work on quantum polynomial system solving and algebraic cryptanalysis were
mainly based on Grover’s algorithm [22] which can achieve quadratic speed-up for exhaust
search. The idea of these work are similar: reduce the problem to be solved to a search problem
by designing a proper oracle and then use Grover’s algorithm. Schwabe-Westerbaan [29] and
more recently Fauge`re et al [19] proposed quantum algorithms for solving Boolean multivariate
quadratic polynomial systems (MQ). In particular, a Las-Vegas quantum algorithm for solving
Boolean MQ with complexities O(20.462n) was given under certain conditions. On the other
hand, the complexity of our algorithm is polynomial in n, the total sparseness, and the condi-
tion number. One nice feature of our algorithm is that the complexity depends on the structure
of polynomial system and provides faster algorithms for sparse systems with small condition
numbers.
In [21], Grassl et al presented quantum circuits to search the key for AES based on Grover’s
algorithm. This is possible because, once the keys are given, the polynomial system for AES
can be solved easily. For AES-128, 192, and 256, the gates (complexity) used in the circuits
are about 286, 2118, 2151 [29], respectively. Comparing to our result in Table 1, we have the
following observations. The ratio of the complexities of AES-256 to that of AES-128 in Table
1 is 25, while the same ratio for the complexities in [21] is 265. This shows the advantage of
the polynomial-time nature of our algorithm: when the key is doubled, the complexity increases
little, while for the exponential algorithm in [21], when the key doubles, the complexity increases
exponentially. On the other hand, using Grover’s algorithm, the explicit complexities were given
in [29], while our algorithm is much complicated and the complexities in Table 1 contain the
parameters c and k.
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2 A modified HHL algorithm
In this section, we give a modified HHL algorithm for solving the linear system Ax = b, where
special assumptions about A and b are made. The modified HHL algorithm will be used in our
algorithm for solving Boolean equations.
For a matrix A ∈ CM×N , the arithmetic square root of each nonzero eigenvalue of the matrix
A†A is called a singular value of A, and the quotient of the maximal and minimal singular values
is called the condition number of A, where A† denotes the complex conjugate transpose of A. A
matrix A ∈ CM×N is called s-sparse if each row and column of A has at most s nonzero entries.
We say that the complexity of a query for A is O(γ), if there is an algorithm to find all the
nonzero entries in each row or column of A in time O(γ).
The following HHL quantum algorithm [23] was given to solve a linear equation system
A|x〉 = |b〉 over C.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that A ∈ CM×N is an s-sparse matrix and the complexity of a query
for A is O(s). Let |b〉 ∈ CM be a unitary quantum state. Then, there is a quantum algorithm
which can give an ǫ-approximation to a solution state of the linear system A|x〉 = |b〉 in runtime
complexity O˜(log(M +N)s2κ2/ǫ), where κ is the condition number of A.
As usual, the notation O˜ suppresses more slowly-growing logarithm terms. With the best
known algorithm for Hamiltonian simulation [5], the complexity of the HHL algorithm can be
reduced to O˜(log(M +N)sκ2/ǫ). Ambainis gave a new version of the HHL algorithm which has
complexity O˜(log(M + N)s2κ/ǫ3) [2]. Childs-Kothari-Somma gave a new quantum algorithm
for linear equation solving, which has complexity O˜(sκ2 log(1/ǫ)(log(M+N)+log2.5(1/ǫ))) [13].
In the rest of this section, we will present a modified version of the HHL algorithm under
the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. A ∈ CM×N is s-sparse and has a decomposition A =∑sj=1Aj , where each
Aj is a 1-sparse matrix with the complexity of a query to be O(γ).
Assumption 2. Let b ∈ {0, 1}M and M = r2v for positive integers v, r. Furthermore,
b[i] = 1 if and only if i = k2v for k = 0, . . . , ρ− 1, where ρ is a positive integer ≤ r.
We have the following modified HHL algorithm which follows from Lemma 2.9.
Theorem 2.2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the HHL algorithm can give an ǫ-approximation
to a solution state of the linear equation system Ax = b in runtime complexity O˜((log(M +N)+
γ)sκ2/ǫ), where κ is the condition number of A.
Remark 2.3. Theorem 2.2 differs from Theorem 2.1 in the following aspects. (1) b is given
as a vector instead of a state |b〉. (2) A satisfies different conditions: A is s-sparse, but its
complexity of a query is O(sγ), while the complexity of a query for A is O(s) in Theorem 2.1.
(3) γ is added to the complexity. (4) In the complexity, s2 is reduced to s, which can also be
done with best known algorithm for Hamiltonian simulation [5], but under the condition that the
complexity of a query for A is O(s).
Remark 2.4. In the cryptanalysis to be given later in this paper, we make the following ap-
proximation to the complexities of the HHL algorithm O˜((log(M +N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ) ≃ c(log(M +
N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ), where c is called the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
For a matrix A ∈ CM×N , denote I(A) =
(
0 A
A† 0
)
∈ C(N+M)×(N+M), which is a Hermitian
matrix. In fact, the HHL algorithm will solve the linear system(
0 A
A† 0
)(
0
x
)
=
(
b
0
)
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instead of Ax = b [23].
We will prove Theorem 2.2 in two steps: first consider the Hamiltonian simulation for eiI(A)t
and second consider the preparation for the state |b〉, where i = √−1. We need the following
result about the quantum complexity for the Hamiltonian simulation.
Lemma 2.5 ([4]). For a 1-sparseness decomposition A =
∑u
j=1Aj of a matrix A ∈ CM×N and
a given time t, we can quantumly simulate eiI(A)t ≃ (∏uj=1 eiI(Aj)t0)t/t0 for any small number
t0 by O(log(M + N)(log
∗(M + N))2ut) = O˜(log(M + N)ut) auxiliary operations and totally
O(log∗(M +N)ut) queries for the Ajs, where log∗(n) = min{r | log(r)2 n < 2} (the (r) indicating
the iterated logarithm).
In the following lemma, we modify the HHL algorithm to take into the fact that A already
has a 1-sparseness decomposition.
Lemma 2.6. Under Assumption 1, the HHL algorithm gives an ǫ-approximation to a solution
state of the linear system Ax = |b〉 in time O˜((log(M +N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ), where κ is the condition
number of A.
Proof. The complexity for the HHL algorithm comes from the Hamiltonian simulation eiI(A)t
for time t = κ2/ǫ [23]. It is proved that I(A) can be decomposed as the summation of (log∗(M+
N)s2) 1-sparse matrices. By Lemma 2.5, the complexity for the HHL algorithm is O˜(log(M +
N)s2κ2/ǫ), where the complexity for the query is negligible [23].
Under Assumption 1, since I(A) can be decomposed as the summation of s matrices of
1-sparseness, by Lemma 2.5, the complexity for the modified HHL algorithm will decrease to
O˜(log(M +N)st+ log∗(M +N)stγ)|t=κ2/ǫ = O˜((log(M +N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ), since log∗(M +N) is
approximately a constant [4].
We need the following detailed information about the HHL algorithm.
Lemma 2.7. [23] Let λ1, . . . , λn be the singular values of A ∈ CM×N , |vj〉 (|uj〉) the eigenvectors
of A†A (AA†) with respect to the nonzero eigenvalues λ2j of A
†A, and thus A =
n∑
j=1
λj |uj〉〈vj | is
the singular value decomposition of A. Then, the HHL algorithm returns an ǫ-approximation to
the solution state | x˜‖x˜‖〉, where
x˜ =
n∑
j=1
λ−1j |vj〉〈vj |b〉. (1)
Furthermore, x˜ has the minimal norm ‖x˜‖ =√〈x˜, x˜〉 among all solutions for Ax = b.
In Lemma 2.6, |b〉 ∈ CM is given as a quantum state and there exist no efficient algorithms to
generate |b〉 in the general case [1]. In the rest of this section, we will modify the HHL algorithm
such that the input to the HHL algorithm is b instead of |b〉 under Assumption 2. We first
prove a lemma.
Lemma 2.8. Let Bx = c be obtained by adding more “equations” 0x = 1 to A|x〉 = |b〉. Then
using HHL to B|x〉 = |c〉, we obtain the same solution state as that of A|x〉 = |b〉.
Proof. Let B =
(
A
0
)
and c =
(
b
1
)
, where we use 0 (1) to represent certain maxtix of zeros
(ones) with the proper dimension. We have B†B = A†A. Then, adding some 0 rows to A will
not change the nonzero eigenvalues of A†A and the eigenvectors of B†B are the same as that of
A†A. Now, the lemma follows from Lemma 2.7.
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In the following lemma, we modify the HHL algorithm to take into the fact that b contains
ρ nonzero entries.
Lemma 2.9. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the HHL algorithm can give an ǫ-approximation
to a solution state of the linear system Ax = b in time O˜((log(M +N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ).
Proof. Let σ = ⌈log2 ρ⌉ ≤ log2 r + 1. Let w ∈ {0, 1}2v such that w[0] = 1 and w[i] = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , 2v − 1. Adding 2σ − ρ blocks w before the ρ2v-th row of b, we have a vector c such
that c[i] = 1 if and only if i = k2v for k = 0, 1, . . . , 2σ−1. Correspondingly, by adding (2σ−ρ)2v
zero rows to A before the ρ2v-th row of A, we obtain a matrix B ∈ C((r+2σ−ρ)2v)×N . Note
that adding some zero rows will not increase the sparseness and the complexity of a query for a
matrix. Then the equation system Ax = b becomes
Bx = c (2)
We may add more zero rows at the ends of B and c such that B ∈ C2η×N and c ∈ C2η , where
η = ⌈log2(r + 2σ − ρ)⌉+ v. With these assumptions, we can easily generate the state |c〉:
|c〉 = ⊗η−σ−vi=1 |0〉 ⊗σi=1 (H|0〉) ⊗vi=1 |0〉,
where H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
is the Hadamard operator. The complexity of generating |c〉 is O(η)
= O(v+log r) = O(log(M)), since σ = ⌈log2 ρ⌉ ≤ log2 r+1 and M = r2v. The equation system
(2) becomes
C|x〉 = |c〉 (3)
where C = B
2σ/2
. We show that C satisfies Assumption 1. It is clear that C can be written as
the summation of s 1-sparse matrices Cj . The complexity of a query for Cj is the same as that
of Aj , because the (u, v)-th element of C is the (u, v)-th element of B divided by 2
σ/2, in other
words, we do not need to actually generate the matrix C.
By Lemma 2.8, equation system (3) has the same solution state as that of A|x〉 = |b〉, when
using the HHL algorithm to them. As mentioned before, the HHL algorithm actually solves
I(C)(0, x)T = (c, 0)T . Similar to the above procedure, we can add more zeros to the end of
(c, 0)T to obtain a state, which costs at most O(log(2η +N)) = O(log(M +N)).
By Lemma 2.6, the total complexity is the complexity of using the HHL algorithm to (3)
plus that of generating |c〉, that is, O˜((log(M + N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ + log(M + N)) = O˜((log(M +
N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ).
Remark 2.10. If γ is small, say γ = O(log(M +N)), then the complexity of the modified HHL
algorithm is O˜((log(M +N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ) = O˜(log(M +N)sκ2/ǫ). Fortunately, the linear system
to be solved in Section 3 has this property.
3 Quantum monomial-solving of polynomial systems over C
In this section, we give a quantum algorithm to find the a solution for the monomials of a
polynomial system F , which satisfy a linear system.
3.1 The Macaulay linear system
In this section, we will construct a Macaulay linear system for a finite set of polynomials and
show that the linear system satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 given in Section 2.
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Let C be the field of complex numbers and C[X] the polynomial ring in the indeterminates
X = {x1, . . . , xn}. For a polynomial f ∈ C[X], denote deg(f), #f , and m(f) to be the total
degree of f , the sparseness (the number of terms) of f , and the set of monomials of f . For
S ⊂ C[X], we use VC(S) ⊂ Cn to denote the common zeros of the polynomials in S.
Let m denote the set of all the monomials in variables X. In this section, we will use
the lexicographic monomial ordering for x1 > · · · > xn. For convenience, we denote 0 =
(0, 0, . . . , 0),1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Cn, and Xα = ∏ni=1 xαii for α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Zn. For a given
positive integer d, let m≤d be the set of all monomials which are factors of Xd·1 = xd1x
d
2 · · · xdn.
We sort
m≤d = {md,0,md,1, · · · ,md,(d+1)n−1}
in ascending lexicographic monomial ordering. Then md,0 = 1,md,1 = xn,md,2 = x
2
n,md,d =
xdn,md,d+1 = xn−1 and md,(d+1)n−1 = Xd·1. Also note that #m≤d = (d+ 1)n.
In the rest of Section 3, let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ C[X] with di = deg(fi) and ti = #fi for
i = 1, . . . , r. We first define several parameters.
Definition 3.1. Without loss of generality, we may assume fi(0) = −1 for i = 1, . . . ρ and
fi(0) = 0 for i = ρ+1, . . . , r. Let D ∈ N such that D ≥ maxri=1 di. Let d¯ be the minimal integer
satisfying d¯ ≥ D −mini di and d¯ + 1 = 2δ for certain δ ∈ N. Set D¯ to be the minimal integer
satisfying D¯ ≥ D and D¯ + 1 = 2∆ for certain ∆ ∈ N.
Remark 3.2. In this paper, the subscripts for a matrix or a vector always start from 0, be-
cause, the complexity analysis of the algorithm in this paper depends on the representation of
the subscripts.
For i = 1, . . . , r and each md¯,j ∈ m≤d¯ with deg(md¯,j) ≤ D − di, md¯,jfi could be considered
as a linear function in the monomials in m≤D¯. For deg(md¯,j) > D − di, we replace md¯,jfi by 0.
In order to write these functions precisely, introduce the following new notation:
md¯,j,i =
{
md¯,j, if deg(md¯,j) ≤ D − di;
0, if deg(md¯,j) > D − di
(4)
for i = 1, . . . , r and j = 0, . . . , (d¯ + 1)n − 1. We rewrite md¯,j,ifi for i = 1, . . . , r and j =
1, . . . , (d¯+ 1)n − 1 in matrix form:
mD¯,1 < mD¯,2 < · · · < mD¯,(D¯+1)n−1

md¯,0,1f1 · · ·
... · · ·
md¯,(d¯+1)n−1,1f1 · · ·
md¯,0,2f2 · · ·
... · · ·
md¯,(d¯+1)n−1,rfr · · ·


mD¯,1
mD¯,2
...
mD¯,(D¯+1)n−1
=
mD¯,0 = 1

−f1(0)
...
0
−f2(0)
...
0
, (5)
denoted as
MF ,DmD = bF ,D, (6)
where
mD = (mD¯,1,mD¯,2, . . . ,mD¯,(D¯+1)n−1)
T .
Then the (i− 1)(d¯+1)n-th to the (i(d¯+1)n− 1)-th rows of MF ,D are generated by m≤d¯fi. The
i-th column of MF ,D consists of the coefficients of mD¯,i+1 in md¯,0f1, . . . ,md¯,(d¯+1)n−1fr. MF ,D is
9
called the modified Macaulay matrix of the polynomial system F and (6) is called the Macaulay
linear system of F . MF ,D is a matrix over C of dimension (r(d¯ + 1)n) × ((D¯ + 1)n − 1) =
(r2nδ)× (2n∆ − 1).
Remark 3.3. The columns corresponding to monomial mD¯,j with deg(mD¯,j) > D are all 0
columns.
Remark 3.4. The zero rows are added so that the modified Macaulay matrix can be efficiently
queried. Refer to Lemma 3.10 for details.
Example 3.5. Let f1 = x
2
1 − x2, f2 = x2 − 1, f3 = x1x2 − 1, D = 2. Then d¯ = 1, D¯ = 3 and
the Macaulay linear system is


f1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0(x2f1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0(x1f1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0(x1x2f1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x2f2 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
x1f2 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0(x1x2f2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0(x2f3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0(x1f3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0(x1x2f3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


x2
x22
x32
x1
x1x2
x1x
2
2
x1x
3
2
x21
x21x2
x21x
2
2
x21x
3
2
x31
x31x2
x31x
2
2
x31x
3
2
=


0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
.
In the rest of this section, we will prove the following main result of this section, which
follows from Lemmas 3.7, 3.8, and 3.10.
Lemma 3.6. The Macaulay linear system MF ,DmD = bF ,D satisfied Assumptions 1 and 2,
where the parameters are: M = r2δn, N = 2∆n− 1, s = TF , γ = O(n log(D)+ log r), ρ ≤ r− 1.
The parameters δ,∆, ρ,D are defined in Definition 3.1.
For nonnegative integers B > 1 and k < Bn, we denote k(B) = (kn−1, . . . , k0), where
k =
∑n−1
i=0 kiB
i is the B-base representation of k and thus 0 ≤ ki < B. On the other hand, for
k = (kn−1, . . . , k0) such that 0 ≤ ki < B, let k(B) =
∑n−1
i=0 kiB
i. The following simple fact is
crucial in the complexity analysis of our algorithm: the k-th element in m≤d is
md,k = X
k(d+1) =
n−1∏
i=0
xkii+1 with deg(md,k) =
n−1∑
i=0
ki (7)
where k(d+1) = (kn−1, . . . , k0). Equation (7) is true under the assumption made in Remark 3.2.
Lemma 3.7. We have d¯+1 ≤ 2D and D¯+1 ≤ 2D+1. As a consequence, MF ,D is of dimension
(r(d¯+ 1)n)× ((D¯ + 1)n − 1) = (r2nδ)× (2n∆ − 1) = O(r(2D)n)×O((2D + 1)n).
Proof. From Definition 3.1 of d¯ and D¯, we have d¯+ 1 ≤ 2D − 2mini di + 1 ≤ 2D and D¯ + 1 ≤
2D + 1.
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Lemma 3.8. Let fi =
∑ti
j=1 cijX
αij for i = 1, . . . , r, where ti = #fi. Then MF ,D has a natural
1-sparseness decomposition:
MF ,D =
r∑
i=1
ti∑
j=1
cijMij, (8)
where each Mij is a 1-sparse {0, 1}-matrix. In fact, only the ((i−1)(d¯+1)n+k, (k(d¯+1)+αij)(D¯+1))
entries in Mij equal to 1 for 0 ≤ k < (d¯+ 1)n with
∑n
t=1 k(d¯+1)[t] ≤ D − di.
Proof. We can treat the coefficients cij of fi as new indeterminates and then write MF ,D as a
function in cij . The coefficient of cij is Mij. Since cijX
αij is a term of fi, only md¯,kfi contains
terms whose coefficient are cij , which corresponds to the ((i− 1)(d¯+ 1)n + k)-th row generated
by md¯,kfi for 0 ≤ k < (d¯+ 1)n with deg(md¯,kfi) ≤ D, or
∑n
t=1 k(d¯+1)[t] ≤ D − di equally. Since
md¯,k · Xαij = Xk(d¯+1) · Xαij = Xk(d¯+1)+αij = mD¯,(k(d¯+1)+αij)(D¯+1) , only the (k(d¯+1) + αij)(D¯+1)-th
entry in the ((i− 1)(d¯+1)n + k)-th row of Mij is nonzero. The 1-sparseness of Mij comes from
the fact that the rows and columns of the nonzero entries are distinct.
As a direct consequence, we have
Corollary 3.9. MF ,D is TF -sparse, where TF =
∑r
i=1 ti is called the total sparseness of F .
Lemma 3.10. The complexity of a query for Mij is O(n log(D)+log r), where Mij is introduced
in Lemma 3.8.
Proof. Given a row index i0, we want to know the nonzero entry in the i0-th row. By Lemma
3.8, the i0-th row has a nonzero entry if and only if (i − 1)(d¯ + 1)n ≤ i0 < i(d¯ + 1)n and∑n
t=1(i0 − (i − 1)(d¯ + 1))(d¯+1)[t] ≤ D − di. Compute the quotient l and remainder k such that
i0 = (d¯+1)
nl+ k. By Lemma 3.8, the i0-th row has a nonzero entry if and only if l = i− 1 and∑n
t=1 k(d¯+1)[t] ≤ D − di, meanwhile the nonzero entry is at the (k(d¯+1) + αij)(D¯+1)-th column.
We now analyse the complexity of the above step. Without loss of generality, we assume
that all the numbers are represented in binary form, which is crucial to the complexity. Since
d¯+ 1 = 2δ is a power of 2, we can compute (d¯ + 1)n = 2δn easily in time O(log(n) log(log(d¯))).
We can check
∑n
t=1 k(d¯+1)[t] ≤ D−di in time log(n logD). Since all numbers are binary, the last
δn bits of i0 are exactly the remainder k, and other bits are the quotient l. As a result, we can
compute both l and k in time O(log(n) log(log(d¯))). Since the number of bits for i0 is O(log i0) =
O(log(r(d¯+1)n) = O(log r+n log d¯), the complexity is bounded by O(log r+n log d¯). Since both
d¯+1 = 2δ and D¯+1 = 2∆ are powers of 2 and k is in binary form, we can insert (∆−δ) zeros before
each δ bits of k starting from lower digits to obtain (k(d¯+1))(D¯+1) in time O(n log(D¯)). Totally,
we can compute (k(d¯+1) + αij)(D¯+1) in time O(log(n) log(log(D¯))+n log(D¯)) = O(n log(D¯)). So
the total complexity is O(n log(D¯) + (log r + n log d¯)) = O(n log(D) + log r) by Lemma 3.7.
On the other hand, given a column index j0, we want to know the nonzero entries in the
j0-th column. Compute k = (j0)(D¯+1) − αij first. If k is a nonnegative vector, we can compute
k(d¯+1). By Lemma 3.8, only if
∑n
t=1 k[t] ≤ D− di, the (k(d¯+1) + (j − 1)(d¯+ 1)n)-th entry is the
unique nonzero entry in the j0-th column. Else the j0-th column is a 0 column. Similarly, the
complexity is O(n log(D) + log r).
3.2 Complete solving degree for a polynomial system
In this section, we show how to determine a D such that the monomials of a polynomial system
F can be solved from the Macaulay linear system MF ,DmD = bF ,D by introducing the concept
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of complete solving degree. We first define the concept of solving degree [26, 7], which is an
important concept for polynomial system solving.
Definition 3.11. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ C[X] and (F) the ideal generated by F . Let G be the
reduced Gro¨bner basis of the ideal (F) under the degree reverse lexicographic (DRL) monomial
ordering. D is called the solving degree of F , if D is the minimal integer such that for any
g ∈ G, g = ∑ri=1 hifi for some h1, . . . , hr ∈ C[X] satisfying deg(hifi) ≤ D. Denote the solving
degree of F by Sdeg(F).
In terms of the F4 algorithm [18] or the XL algorithm [14], D is the solving degree of F , if
the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal (F) can be obtained from MF ,DmD = bF ,D by using Gaussian
elimination over C.
For a polynomial f ∈ C[X], denote fh to be the homogenization of f in C[x0,X]. We have
the following upper bound for the solving degree.
Theorem 3.12 ([7] Corollary 3.26). Let I = (f1, . . . , fr) ⊂ C[X] be an ideal generated by
f1, . . . , fr of degrees d1, . . . , dr, such that d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dr. Choose the DRL monomial
ordering. If Ih = (fh1 , . . . , f
h
r ) is zero-dimensional, then Sdeg(F) ≤ d1 + · · ·+ dn+1 − n+1 with
dn+1 = 1 if r = n.
The following example shows that the solving degree is not large enough for monomial solving
with the Macaulay linear system.
Example 3.13. Let F = {x1x2−1, x21−x1, x22−x2, x23−x3} ⊂ C[x1, x2, x3]. The reduced Gro¨bner
basis for (F) is G = {x1−1, x2−1, x23−x3}. Since x1−1 = x2(x21−x1)+(1−x1)(x1x2−1) and
x2− 1 = x1(x22−x2)+ (1−x2)(x1x2− 1), we have Sdeg(F) = 3. The residue monomials of (F)
with respect to G is {1, x3}. Let D = 3, we want to solve the monomials of degrees ≤ D from the
Macaulay linear system MF ,DmD = bF ,D, or more precisely, we want to written all monomials
of degrees ≤ 3 as expressions of x3. After doing Gaussian elimination to the Macaulay system,
the nontrivial polynomials are: G3 = {x1−1, x2−1, x21−1, x1x2−1, x22−1, x23−x3, x31−1, x21x2−
1, x21x3−x1x3, x1x22− 1, x1x2x3−x3, x1x23−x1x3, x32− 1, x22x3−x2x3, x2x23−x2x3, x33−x3}. We
can see that each monomial of degree ≤ 3 is solved in terms of x3, x1x3, and x2x3, which means
that the Macaulay linear system does not give the “correct” solution to the monomials and the
monomials x1x3 and x2x3 are not solved in terms of x3.
Motivated by the above example, we introduce the concept of complete solving degree.
Definition 3.14. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ C[X] and (F) the ideal generated by F . Let G be
the reduced Gro¨bner basis of the ideal (F) under the DRL monomial ordering. D is called the
complete solving degree of F , if D is the minimal integer such that for any polynomial g ∈ G and
any monomial m ∈ C[X] satisfying deg(mg) ≤ D, mg = ∑ri=1 hifi for some h1, . . . , hr ∈ C[X]
with each deg(hifi) ≤ D. Denote the complete solving degree of F by CSdeg(F).
Example 3.15. For the F given in Example 3.13, we have CSdeg(F) = 4. For D = 4,
after doing Gaussian elimination to the Macaulay linear system, we obtain G4 = G3 ∪ {x1x3 −
x3, x2x3 − x3, x41 − 1, x31x2 − 1, x31x3 − x3, x21x22 − 1, x21x2x3 − x3, x21x23 − x3, x1x32 − 1, x1x22x3 −
x3, x1x2x
2
3−x3, x1x33−x3, x42−1, x32x3−x3, x22x23−x3, x2x33−x3, x43−x3}. Note that all monomials
with degree ≤ 4 are written as expressions of the residue monomials 1, x3. In other words, the
monomials are solved with the Macaulay system for D = 4.
In this paper, we will consider polynomial systems of the following form
F = F1 ∪ F2 ⊂ C[X], where F1 = {g1, . . . , gr} 6= ∅,F2 = {f1, . . . , fn} (9)
such that ∀i, j (lm(fi) = xdii , di ≥ 1, and degxi(gj) < di)
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where lm(fi) is the largest monomial of fi under the DRL monomial ordering, also called the
leading monomial of fi. We will give upper bounds for the solving degree and complete solving
degree for a polynomial system of form (9) in the following lemmas. Note that the proofs of
these results do not depend on the results in [26, 7].
Lemma 3.16. For F given in (9), we have (F) is zero-dimensional and Sdeg(F) ≤ d − n +∑n
i=1 di, where d = maxi deg(gi).
Proof. By the Hilbert function, it is easy to see that (F2) is zero-dimensional and hence (F)
is zero-dimensional. Let I = (F) and G the reduced Gro¨bner basis for (F) under the DRL
monomial ordering. Denote lm(I) to be the set of the leading monomials of the polynomials
in I. Since xdii ∈ lm(I), there exists a unique polynomial f ′i in G such that lm(f ′i) = x
d′i
i
with d′i ≤ di. For any h ∈ G, let h =
∑n
k=1 akfk +
∑r
l=1 blgl. We claim that deg(h) ≤
max{d1, . . . , dn,
∑n
i=1 di−n}. If h is reduced by each f ′k, we have degxk(h) < degxk(f ′k) = d′k ≤ dk
and deg(h) ≤ ∑ni=1 di − n. Otherwise, h is exactly f ′k for some k, and then deg(h) = d′k ≤ dk.
Thus we have deg(h) ≤ max{dk,
∑n
i=1 di − n} and the claim is proved.
If bj is not reduced by some fi, we have bj = pfi + q where q is reduced by fi and h =
(
∑n
k=1,k 6=i akfk + (pgj + ai)fi) + (
∑r−n
l=1,l 6=j blgl + qgj). Still write the new expression as h =∑n
k=1 akfk +
∑r
l=1 blgl. As a consequence, we can assume that each bj is reduced by F2 and
hence deg(bl) ≤
∑n
i=1 di − n.
Let h˜ = h−∑rl=1 blgl =∑nk=1 akfk ∈ (F2). From (9), it is easy to see that F2 is a Gro¨bner
basis for (F2). Then, there exist a˜1, . . . , a˜n such that h˜ =
∑n
k=1 a˜kfk with deg(a˜kfk) ≤
deg(h˜) ≤ max{h, blgl}. Thus we have h =
∑n
k=1 a˜kfk +
∑r−n
l=1 blgl. By the definition of
solving degree, we have Sdeg(F) ≤ max{deg(a˜kfk),deg(blgl)} ≤ max{deg(h˜),deg(blgl)} ≤
max{deg(h),deg(blgl)} ≤ max{d1, . . . , dn,
∑n
i=1 di − n,
∑n
i=1 di − n + d} =
∑n
i=1 di − n + d,
where the last equation comes from the assumption di ≥ 1.
Lemma 3.17. For F given in (9), we have CSdeg(F) ≤ d − 2n + 2∑ni=1 di, where d =
maxi deg(gi).
Proof. Let I = (F) and D = d− 2n+ 2∑ni=1 di. Fix a monomial m ∈ lm(I) with deg(m) ≤ D.
We first claim that there exists an h =
∑
i pifi +
∑
j qjgj for some pi, qj ∈ C[X] such that
lm(h) = m, deg(pifi) ≤ D, and deg(qjgj) ≤ D. If m is a multiple of some lm(fi), we have m =
lm( m
lm(fi)
fi) with deg(
m
lm(fi)
fi) ≤ D and the claim is proved. Otherwise, we have degxi(m) < di
for each i and thus deg(m) ≤∑ni=1 di − n. There exists a g in the reduced Gro¨bner basis G of
(F), such that lm(g)|m. Let g =∑k akfk+∑l blgl with deg(akfk),deg(blgl) ≤ Sdeg(F), and we
have m = lm( m
lm(g)
g) = lm(
∑
k
m
lm(g)
akfk +
∑
l
m
lm(g)
blgl) with deg(
m
lm(g)
akfk),deg(
m
lm(g)
blgl) ≤
deg(m) + Sdeg(F) ≤∑ni=1 di− n+Sdeg(F) ≤ D, where the last inequality comes from Lemma
3.16 and the assumption deg(m) ≤∑ni=1 di − n. The claim is proved.
We now prove the lemma. Fix a polynomial g ∈ G and a monomial m ∈ C[X] satisfying
deg(mg) ≤ D. Since lm(mg) ∈ lm(I) and deg(mg) ≤ D, by the claim just proved, there exists
an h =
∑
i pifi +
∑
j qjgj for some pi, qj ∈ C[X] such that lm(mg) = lm(h), deg(pifi) ≤ D,
and deg(qjgj) ≤ D. Let g˜ = mg − lc(mg)lc(h) h, where lc(p) is the coefficient of lm(p) in p for any
p ∈ C[X]. Then g˜ ∈ I and deg(lm(g˜)) < D. We thus can repeat the above procedure for g˜
(instead of mg). The process will end and we obtain ĝ = mg −∑ni=1 p̂ifi −∑rj=1 q̂jgj , where
lm(ĝ) 6∈ lm(I), deg(p̂ifi) ≤ D, and deg(q̂jgj) ≤ D. Since lm(ĝ) 6∈ lm(I) and ĝ ∈ I, we have
ĝ = 0 and hence mg =
∑n
i=1 p̂ifi +
∑r
j=1 q̂jgj . The lemma is proved.
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3.3 Solution of the Macaulay linear system
The following lemma gives the solutions to the Macaulay linear system (5) by using the complete
solving degree.
Lemma 3.18. Let I = (F) be a radical zero-dimensional ideal in C[X] generated by F and
VC(I) = {a1, . . . ,aw}. For D ≥ CSdeg(F), any solution mD of the Macaulay linear system
MF ,DmD = bF ,D is of the form
m̂D =
w∑
i=1
ηimD(ai) +
∑
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i]>D
µkek−1,
where ηi are complex numbers such that
∑w
i=1 ηi = 1, µk are arbitrary complex numbers, and ek
is the k-th unit vector in C(D¯+1)
n−1.
Proof. From (7), we have deg(mD¯,k) =
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i]. By Remark 3.3, if deg(mD¯,k) =
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i]
> D, then the (k− 1)-th row in MF ,D corresponded to mD¯,k is a zero column, so mD¯,k can take
arbitrary value in the solution of the Macaulay linear system and hence µkek−1 is a solution of
the Macaulay linear system. Delete the (k − 1)-th column in MF ,D and the (k − 1)-th row in
mD and bF ,D to obtain a new system M˜F ,Dm˜F ,D = b˜F ,D.
When we do Gaussian elimination on the linear system M˜F ,Dm˜F ,D = b˜F ,D, we get a new
linear system MF ,Dm˜F ,D = bF ,D . Since D ≥ CSdeg(F), the largest monomial in each row
of MF ,D is in lm(I) and each monomial in lm(I) occurs as one of the leading monomials
for some row. Thus, the dimension of the solution space of MF ,Dm˜F ,D = bF ,D is at most
#(m≤D\lm(I))−1 ≤ #(m\lm(I))−1 = #V (I)−1 = w−1, where the first equality is true because
I is radical. Since each m˜D(ai) is a solution of MF ,Dm˜D = bF ,D, {
∑
ηim˜D(ai)|
∑
ηi = 1} is a
subspace of the solution space of MF ,Dm˜D = bF ,D, that is, the solution space is of dimension at
least w − 1. Then, {∑ ηim˜D(ai)|∑ ηi = 1} is exactly the solution space of MF ,Dm˜D = bF ,D,
also that of M˜F ,Dm˜D = b˜F ,D. The lemma is proved.
Corollary 3.19. In Lemma 3.18, if F has a unique solution a, then we have
m̂D =mD(a) +
∑
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i]>D
µkek−1.
Example 3.20. The equation system in Example 3.5 has a unique solution a = (1, 1), with
mD(a1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). By Lemma 3.18, the solution of the Macaulay
linear system is (1, 1, 1 + µ3, 1, 1, 1 + µ6, 1 + µ7, 1, 1 + µ9, 1 + µ10, 1 + µ11, 1 + µ12, 1 + µ13, 1 +
µ14, 1 + µ15), where each µi is an arbitrary complex number. The solutions of the form 1 + µk
correspond to the zero columns of MF ,D.
3.4 A quantum algorithm for monomial-solving of polynomial systems
In this section, we show that applying the HHL algorithm to the Macaulay linear system of F ,
we obtain a pseudo solution of F .
Let F ⊂ C[X] with VC(F) = {a1, . . . ,aw} and m a vector of monomials in X. A normalized
linear combination of
∑
i cim(ai) such that
∑
i ci = 1 is also a solution to the Macualay linear
system, which is called a pseudo solution of F .
Note that a pseudo solution of F is a solution of the Macualay linear system. From Lemma
3.18, the converse is not rue: a solution of the Macaulay linear system contains some arbitrary
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constants µk and is not a pseudo solution of F . Fortunately, applying the HHL algorithm to the
Macaulay linear system, the solution of the Macualay linear system is a pseudo solution of F .
We introduce the notation m˜ ∈ m(D¯+1)n−1: for k = 1, . . . , (D¯ + 1)n − 1,
m˜D[k] =
{
mD¯,k, if deg(mD¯,k) =
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i] ≤ D;
0, if deg(mD¯,k) =
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i] > D.
(10)
Using the modified HHL algorithm (Theorem 2.2) to the Macaulay linear system, we have
Theorem 3.21. Let I = (F) be a radical zero-dimensional ideal in C[X] generated by F ,
VC(I) = {a1, . . . ,aw}, ǫ ∈ (0, 1), and D ≥ CSdeg(F). Using the modified HHL algorithm to the
Macaulay linear system MF ,DmD = bF ,D defined in (6), the answer is an ǫ-approximation to
the following pseudo solution of F
m̂D =
w∑
i=1
ηim˜D(ai),
where the monomial vector m˜D is defined in (10), ηi are complex numbers satisfying
∑w
i=1 ηi =
1, and ‖∑wi=1 ηim˜D(ai)‖ is minimal. The runtime complexity is O˜(log(D)nTFκ2/ǫ), where
TF =
∑r
i=1#fi and κ is the condition number of MF ,D.
Proof. By Lemma 3.18,
m̂D =
∑
∑
ηi=1
ηimD(ai) +
∑
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i]>D
µkek−1 =
∑
∑
ηi=1
ηim˜D(ai) +
∑
∑
i k(D¯+1)[i]>D
µ˜kek−1.
By Lemma 2.7, ‖m̂D‖ is minimal. Since 〈ek−1|m˜D(ai)〉 = 0, in order for ‖m̂D‖ to be minimized,
each µ˜k = 0. We proved that the solution is indeed a pseudo solution.
We now analyse the complexity. We may change the order of fi such that, the first ρ
polynomials fi have nonzero constant terms. This step costs O(r). By Lemma 3.6, MF ,DmD =
bF ,D satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 for s = TF =
∑r
i=1 ti, γ = n logD + log r, and v = nδ.
By Lemma 3.6, MF ,D is of dimension O(r(2D)n)×O((2D+1)n). By Theorem 2.2 and Lemma
3.10, the complexity of the HHL algorithm is O˜((log(M + N) + γ)sκ2/ǫ) = O˜((log(r(2D)n +
(2D + 1)n) + (n log(D) + log r))TFκ2/ǫ) = O˜((log(r) + n log(D))TFκ2/ǫ) = O˜(log(r)TFκ2/ǫ +
n log(D)TFκ2/ǫ) = O˜(TFκ2/ǫ + n log(D)TFκ2 /ǫ) = O˜(log(D)nTFκ2/ǫ), since r ≤ TF . We
prove the theorem.
By Remark 2.4, the exact complexity for Theorem 3.21 is
Corollary 3.22. The exact complexity to compute |m̂D〉 is c log(M + N)TFκ2/ǫ, where N =
r(d¯+ 1)n, M = (D¯ + 1)n − 1, and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Corollary 3.23. If F satisfies the conditions in Theorem 3.21 and has a unique solution a,
then the solution state is |m〉 = |m˜(a)〉. The complexity is O˜(log(D)nTFκ2/ǫ).
Example 3.24. If using the modified HHL algorithm to solve the linear system in Example 3.5,
by Theorem 3.21, the solution is (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). In order to find the unique
solution x1 = 1, x2 = 1, we need to know how to project (x2, x
2
2, x
3
2, x1, x1x2, x1x
2
2, x1x
3
2, x
2
1, x
2
1x2,
x21x
2
2, x
2
1x
3
2, x
3
1, x
3
1x2, x
3
1x
2
2, x
3
1x
3
2) to (x1, x2) efficiently.
Motivated by the above example, we propose the following problem.
Problem 3.25. Let |u〉 be an N -dimensional quantum state and n≪ N . How can we measure
n selected coordinates of |u〉 efficiently.
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4 Find Boolean solutions for polynomial systems in C[X]
In this section, we will give a quantum algorithm to compute the Boolean solutions of a poly-
nomial system F over C. The key idea is that by measuring the pseudo solutions of F , we may
obtain a Boolean solution of F with high probability.
4.1 A quantum algorithm to find Boolean solutions
A solution a for F ⊂ C[X] is called Boolean, if each coordinate of a is 0 or 1. For F ⊂ C[X], the
set of Boolean solutions of F are denoted as VB(F). We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For F ⊂ C[X], we have VB(F) = VC(F ,HX) = VC(FB ,HX) and I = (FB ,HX) is
radical, where HX = {x21 − x1, . . . , x2n − xn} and FB is obtained from F by replacing xmi in F
with xi for all i and m ∈ N. Furthermore, the complete solving degree CSdeg(FB ∪HX) ≤ 3n.
Proof. The first assertion is easy. Since (FB) + (x1 − a1, . . . , xn − an) is a maximal ideal in the
ring C[X],
(FB ,HX) =
⋂
a1,...,an∈{0,1}
((FB) + (x1 − a1, . . . , xn − an)),
is an intersection of maximal ideals and I is a radical ideal. FB ∪HX is clearly of form (9). By
Lemma 3.17, CSdeg(FB ∪HX) ≤ d− 2n+ 2
∑n
i=1 di ≤ 3n since d ≤ n and di = 2 for all i.
By Lemma 4.1, we can use Theorem 3.21 to compute |m̂D〉 where a bound D = 3n for the
complete solving degree is given. Denote 0 = (0, . . . , 0)T and 1 = (1, . . . , 1)T . Our quantum
algorithm to compute Boolean solutions is given below.
Algorithm 4.2.
Input: F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ C[X] with TF =
∑r
i=1#fi and di = deg(fi). Also ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Output: A Boolean solution a ∈ VC(F ,HX) or ∅ meaning that VC(F ,HX) = ∅, with success
probability at least 1− ǫ.
Step 1: If F(0) = 0, return 0. If F(1) = 0, return 1. Set l = 1.
Step 2: Let F1 = FB and Y = X.
Step 3: Let F2 = F1 ∪HY and D = 3#Y (From Lemma 4.1, D ≥ CSdeg(F2)).
Step 4: Use the modified HHL algorithm (Theorem 2.2) to the Macaulay linear system MF2,D
mD = bF2,D to obtain a state |m̂D〉 with the error bound
√
ǫ1/n, where ǫ1 can be chosen
arbitrarily in (0, 1) such as ǫ1 = 1/2.
Step 5: Measuring |m̂D〉, we obtain a state |ek−1〉 which corresponds mD¯,k in mD.
Step 6: Let mD¯,k =
∏uk
i=1 xni . Set xni = 1 in F1 ⊂ C[Y] for i = 1, . . . , uk.
Step 7: Remove 0 from F1. Set Y = Y \ {xni | i = 1, . . . , uk}.
Step 8: If 1 ∈ F1 or Y = ∅ then goto Step 11
Step 9: If F1 6= ∅ and F1(0) 6= 0, then goto Step 3.
Step 10: Return (a1, . . . , an) where ai = 0 if xi ∈ Y else ai = 1.
Step 11: If l > ⌈logǫ1 ǫ⌉ then return ∅, else l = l + 1 and goto Step 2.
We have the following theorem, which will be proved in the rest of this section.
Theorem 4.3. Algorithm 4.2 has the following properties.
1. If the algorithm returns a solution, then it is a Boolean solution of F = 0. Equivalently,
if F has no Boolean solutions, the algorithm returns ∅.
2. If F has Boolean solutions, the algorithm computes one with probability at least 1− ǫ.
3. The runtime complexity of the algorithm is O˜(n2.5(n+TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ), where κ is the max-
imal condition number for all matrixes MF2,D in Step 4 of the algorithm, called the con-
dition number for the polynomial system F .
First, we briefly explain Algorithm 4.2. The algorithm has two loops: the inner loop from
Step 3 to Step 9 and the outer loop from Step 2 to Step 11.
In the inner loop, we try to find a solution a = (a1, . . . , an) of F1 and in each run of the loop
at least one coordinate of a whose value is 1, say ak = 1, is found. Then, we set xk = 1 and try
to find the rest coordinates of a in the rest of the loop. If the inner loop fails, then we restart
from Step 2 and try to find another solution.
The purpose of the outer loop is two folds. First, by using precision
√
ǫ1
n instead of
√
ǫ
n in
Step 4, the algorithm uses less qubits. We can use a large value for ǫ1 ∈ (0, 1), say ǫ1 = 1/2.
Then the precision needed in Step 4 is
√
ǫ1/n =
1√
2n
which is generally larger than
√
ǫ
n . Second,
the complexity of the algorithm related with the precision decreases from O(1/
√
ǫ) to O(log 1/ǫ).
The reason is the algorithm runs ⌈logǫ1 ǫ⌉ more times of the inner loop but with less precision√
ǫ1
n . Please refer to Lemma 4.7 for the detailed analysis.
We will explain each step of the algorithm below. In Step 1, we first check two easy solutions.
In Step 2, since x2i − xi = 0, we replace xmi by xi in time O˜(nTF ) to obtain FB .
In the inner loop from step 3 to step 9, we will try to find a solution a = (a1, . . . , an) of F1.
In Step 3, the bound D = 3#Y for the completely solving degree can be used due to Lemma
4.1. In Step 4, we use the modified HHL to solve the Macaulay linear system.
In Step 5, we measure the quantum state |m̂D〉. Let |m̂D〉 = (m̂D¯,1, . . . , m̂D¯,(D¯+1)n−1)T .
Then by the property of quantum measurement, with probability |m̂D¯,k|2, the measurement
returns |ek−1〉 (By Remark 3.2, the subscript starts at 0).
In Step 6, we will show later that with high provability mD¯,k =
∏uk
i=1 xni 6= 0 at the solution
a = (a1, . . . , an) to be found. Since ai is either 0 or 1,
∏uk
i=1 ani 6= 0 implies ani = 1 for all ni.
We thus set xni = 1 in Step 7 and try to find the other coordinates of a in the loop from Step
3 to Step 9.
In Step 8, either 1 ∈ F1 or Y = ∅ implies VC(F1,HY) = ∅, because we have both F(0) 6= 0
and F(1) 6= 0 from step 1. This means that we did not find a solution in the loop from Step 3
to Step 9 and need to find another solution by starting from Step 2 again.
In Step 9, if F1 = ∅ or F1(0) = 0, then we find a solution of F : xi = 0 for any xi ∈ Y and
xj = 1 for any xj 6∈ Y, which will be returned in Step 10.
Secondly, we prove the correctness of Theorem 4.3. Part 1 of Theorem 4.3 is obviously true,
since we have checked this fact in the algorithm. Part 2 of Theorem 4.3 follows from Lemma
4.6, and part 3 of Theorem 4.3 follows from Lemma 4.7.
The following key lemma gives the successful probability for Steps 5 and 6.
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Lemma 4.4. In Steps 5 and 6, with a probability > 1 − ǫ1/n, VC(F2) 6= ∅ implies that there
exists an a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VC(F2) with ani = 1 for i = 1, . . . , uk.
Proof. Let |mD〉 =
∑(D¯+1)n−1
j=1 αj |ej−1〉 be the solution state and |m̂D〉 =
∑(D¯+1)n−1
j=1 βj |ej−1〉
be the approximate state obtained with the HHL algorithm. If we can measure the true solution
|mD〉 and obtain |ek−1〉, then αk 6= 0. But the HHL algorithm actually returns |m̂D〉. By
the definition of quantum measurement, measuring |m̂D〉 will return |ek−1〉 with probability βk.
Measuring |m̂D〉 may lead a wrong |ek−1〉, that is, αk = 0 but βk 6= 0. By the definition of
quantum measurement, the probability for this wrong case to happen is ‖∑j,αj=0 βj |ej−1〉‖2 =
‖∑j,αj=0(βj−αj)|ej−1〉‖2 < ‖∑(D¯+1)n−1j=1 (βj−αj)|ej−1〉‖2 = ‖|m̂D〉− |mD〉‖2 < ǫ1/n. In other
words, if the HHL algorithm returns |ek−1〉, then with probability > 1− ǫ1/n, the measurement
returns a correct |ek−1〉 meaning αk 6= 0.
By Theorem 3.21, the HHL algorithm returns m̂D =
∑
a∈VC(F2)
ηam˜(a). Then, we have αk =∑
a∈VC(F2)
ηamD¯,k(a). The condition αk 6= 0 implies that there exists a solution a ∈ VC(F2) such
thatmD¯,k(a) 6= 0. Since a is a Boolean solution, we havemD¯,k(a) = 1. The lemma is proved.
We now compute the successful probability for the inner loop.
Lemma 4.5. The loop from Step 3 to Step 9 will run at most n times, and returns ∅ with
probability < ǫ1 when F = 0 has Boolean solutions.
Proof. Since at each loop, the values of at least one xi will be determined in Step 6, we will
repeat this loop for at most n times. By Lemma 4.4, when F = 0 has Boolean solutions, the
algorithm returns ∅ with probability < 1− (1− ǫ1/n)n < ǫ1.
We now compute the successful probability for the algorithm.
Lemma 4.6. The loop from Step 2 to Step 11 will run at most ⌈logǫ1 ǫ⌉ times and with probability
≥ 1− ǫ, returns a Boolean solution of F = 0 when F = 0 has Boolean solutions.
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, if F has Boolean solutions, then the probability that we reach step 11 is
< ǫ1. The number of loops from Step 2 to Step 11 is at most ⌈logǫ1 ǫ⌉. Then, if F has Boolean
solutions, then the probability that the algorithm returns ∅ is ǫ⌈logǫ1 ǫ⌉1 < ǫ.
Finally, we estimate the runtime complexity of Algorithm 4.2.
Lemma 4.7. The complexity for Algorithm 4.2 is
√
2c(n log2(6n+1)+ log2(r+1))n
1.5(n+1+
TF )κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉. Moreover, it equals to O˜(n2.5(n+ TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. Step 4 is the dominate step in terms of complexities. The complexities for other steps
are very low comparing to that of Step 4. So, we just omit them from the complexity analysis.
We have D ≤ 2n + d from Lemma 3.18. Due to Step 2, we have d ≤ n, so D ≤ 3n. MF2,D
is of dimension (r(d¯ + 1)n) × ((D¯ + 1)n − 1) and (2n + TF )-sparseness. By Corollary 3.22, the
complexity of Step 4 is approximately c log(r(d¯+ 1)n + (D¯ + 1)n − 1)(2n + TF )κ2
√
n/ǫ1.
By Lemma 4.5, the loop from Step 3 to Step 9 will run at most n times. Then the complexity
for the loop from Step 3 to Step 9 is
∑n−1
j=0 (c log(r(d¯+1)
n+(D¯+1)n−1)(2(n−j)+TF )κ2
√
n/ǫ1) ≤
c log(r(d¯+ 1)n + (D¯ + 1)n − 1)(n(n + 1) + nTF )κ2
√
n/ǫ1.
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By Lemma 4.6, the loop from Step 2 to Step 11 will run at most ⌈logǫ1 ǫ⌉ times. Then the total
complexity of the algorithm is c log(r(d¯+1)n+(D¯+1)n−1)(n(n+1)+nTF )κ2
√
n/ǫ1⌈logǫ1 ǫ⌉ =
c log(r(d¯+ 1)n + (D¯ + 1)n − 1)n1.5(n+ 1 + TF )κ2
√
2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉, by choosing ǫ1 to be 1/2.
Since r(d¯+ 1)n + (D¯ + 1)n − 1 ≤ (r + 1)(D¯ + 1)n, we have log(r(d¯+ 1)n + (D¯ + 1)n − 1) ≤
log(r + 1) + n log(D¯ + 1) ≤ log(r + 1) + n log(2D + 1) ≤ log(r + 1) + n log(6n + 1) by Lemma
3.7 (D¯ + 1 ≤ 2D + 1) and 4.1 (D ≤ 3n).
The totally complexity for Algorithm 4.2 is at most
√
2c(n log2(6n+1)+log2(r+1))n
1.5(n+
1+TF )κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ = O˜((n+log(r))n1.5(n+TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(n2.5(n+TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ), because
r ≤ TF .
We have completed the proof of Theorem 4.3. We can easily improve our algorithm as
follows.
Remark 4.8. Given (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Cn, F ⊂ C[X], we can obtain an element in VC(F , x21 −
a1x1, . . . , x
2
n−anxn) by Algorithm 4.2, where we need to replace HX with (x21−a1x1, . . . , x2n−anxn)
and xni = 1 with xni = ani in Step 6.
Remark 4.9. Algorithm 4.2 has complexity O˜(n3.5(n + TF )κ log 1/ǫ) if using Ambainis’ algo-
rithm [2] to solve the Macaulay linear system.
4.2 Obtain all the Boolean solutions
We will show how to find all Booelan solutions of F . For a Boolean solution a of F , the following
lemma shows how to construct a polynomial system F1 satisfying VC(F1,HX) = VC(F ,HX)\{a}.
Lemma 4.10. For a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VC(F ,HX), we have
ProjXVC(F ,HX,S, fa) = VC(F ,HX) \ {a}
where S = {x¯i + xi − 1 | i = 1, . . . , n}, fa =
∏
ai=0
x¯i
∏
ai=1
xi, and x¯i are new variables.
Then we can use the Algorithm 4.2 to find all Boolean Solutions for F = 0.
Algorithm 4.11.
Input: F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ C[X] with TF =
∑r
i=1#fi and di = deg(fi). Also ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Output: VC(F ,HX).
Step 1: Set S = ∅. F1 = F ∪ {x1 + x¯1 − 1, . . . , xn + x¯n − 1} ⊂ C[X,X] with X = {x¯1, . . . , x¯n}.
Step 2: Use Algorithm 4.2 to compute Boolean solutions of F1 = 0. If we obtain ∅, return S.
Else we obtain a Boolean solution a = (a1, . . . , an).
Step 3: S = S ∪ {a}, F1 = F1 ∪ {
∏
ai=0
x¯i
∏
ai=1
xi}. Goto Step 2.
Theorem 4.12. Let w = #VC(F ,HX). Then Algorithm 4.11 finds w Boolean solutions of
F = 0 with complexity O˜(n2.5(n+ TF + w)wκ2 log 1/ǫ), and probability at least (1− ǫ)w.
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, the complexity of the algorithm is
∑w−1
i=0 O˜((2n)
2.5(2n + 3n + TF +
i)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(n2.5(n+ TF + w)wκ2 log 1/ǫ).
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4.3 Computing Boolean solutions to linear systems and applications
Many well-known problems in computation theory and cryptography can be described as finding
the Boolean solutions for linear systems over C. In this section, we consider two such problems
and their computational complexities using our quantum algorithm.
The subset sum problem is an important problem in complexity theory and cryptography.
The problem is: given a set of integers, is there a non-empty subset whose sum is a given
number? The problem can be described as finding the Boolean solutions for a linear system.
We have the following result.
Proposition 4.13. Let A ∈ Zr×n for r < n and b ∈ Zr. There is a quantum algorithm to
find a Boolean solution to the linear system Ax = b with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ and complexity
O˜(n3.5rκ2 log 1/ǫ)
Proof. We have r linear equation of sparseness (n + 1) and n quadratic binomials. Thus T =
2n+nr+r, and by Theorem 4.3, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution for Ax = b
in time O˜(n2.5(n+ 2n+ nr + r)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(n3.5rκ2 log 1/ǫ).
The graph isomorphism problem is another well-known problem in computational theory,
which is to determine whether two finite graphs are isomorphic. We do not know whether it is
NPC or P. The problem can be described as solving the Boolean solutions for a linear system.
Let A and B in Fn×n2 be the adjacent matrices for two graphs, the graph isomorphism problem
is to decide whether there exists a permutation matrix P such that AP = PB.
Proposition 4.14. There is a quantum algorithm to decide whether two graphs with n vertices
are isomorphic with probability ≥ 1− ǫ and complexity O˜(n6.5κ2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. Let A = (aij), B = (bij), P = (xij) with
∑
i xij = 1 for each j,
∑
j xij = 1 for each i, and
x2ij−xij = 0 for each i, j. Thus in the equation system, the number of 2n-sparse linear equations
is n2, the number of (n+1)-sparse linear equations is 2n, and the number of quadratic binomials
is n2. Thus T = 2n3 + 4n2 + 2n, by Theorem 4.3, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean
solution for AP = PB in time O˜((n2)2.5(n2 + 2n3 + 4n2 + 2n)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(n8κ2 log 1/ǫ).
Due to the special property of the problem, the complexity could be reduced as follows.
Considering the loop from Step 3 to Step 9 in Algorithm 4.2, since exactly n of xij equal to 1 in
the permutation matrix P , the number of loops will be n instead of n2. Thus the error bound
in step 4 will be
√
ǫ1/n instead of
√
ǫ1/n2. Finally, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean
solution for AP = PB in time O˜(n8−1.5κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(n6.5κ2 log 1/ǫ).
By Propositions 4.13 and 4.14, in order to determine the quantum complexity of these two
problems, we need only to study the condition numbers of the corresponding equation systems.
5 Solving Boolean equation systems
In this section, we will give a quantum algorithm to solve Boolean equations by converting the
problem into that of computing the Boolean solutions for a 6-sparse polynomial system over C.
5.1 Reduce Boolean systems to polynomial systems over C
Let F2 be the field consisting of 0 and 1. We will consider the problem of equation solving over
F2, or equivalently, solving Boolean equations. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of indeterminants
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and
R2[X] = F2[X]/(HX),
where HX = {x21 − x1, . . . , x2n − xn}. Then R2[X] is a Boolean ring and every ideal in R2 is
radical. Elements in R2 are called Boolean polynomials, which have the form
∑
imi and mi are
Boolean monomials with degree at most one for each xi. Similar to Section 3, we use VF2(F) to
denote the zeros of F ⊂ R2[X] in F2.
The following example shows that we cannot use a method of equation solving over C to
solve Boolean equations directly.
Example 5.1. Let f = x1+x2+1. Then VF2(f) = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}. But VC(f, x21−x1, x22−x2) =
∅.
The following lemma shows how to reduce Boolean equation solving to equation solving over
C.
Lemma 5.2. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} be a set of Boolean polynomials with ti = #fi. In C[X], let
C(fi) =
∏⌊ti/2⌋
k=fi(0)
(fi − 2k) and let
C(F) = {C(f1), . . . , C(fr)} ⊂ C[X]. (11)
Then VF2(F) = VB(C(F)) which is the Boolean solutions of C(F). Furthermore, #C(fi) ≤
ti(ti + 1)
⌊ti/2⌋.
Proof. Let fi =
∑ti
k=1mik and a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ VF2(F). When we regard fi as a polynomial in
C[X], fi(a) =
∑ti
k=1mik(a) is an even integer between fi(0) and ti, because fi(a) ≡ 0 mod 2.
Thus a is a zero of C(fi) =
∏⌊ti/2⌋
k=fi(0)
(fi− 2k). The other direction is easy: a Boolean solution a
of C(fi) =
∏⌊ti/2⌋
k=fi(0)
(fi − 2k) satisfies fi(a) = 2k for some k, and hence a is a Boolean solution
for F . Finally, in the worst case, fi(0) = 0 and #C(fi) ≤ ti(ti + 1)⌊ti/2⌋.
Note that #C(fi) increases exponentially in terms of ti. In order to obtain sparse poly-
nomials, we split each fi into several s-sparse Boolean polynomials for a given s ∈ N≥3. Let
f =
∑t
i=1mi be a Boolean polynomial. Set St = ⌈ t−ss−2⌉ and Uf = {u1, . . . , uSt} be a set of new
variables depending on f . We define a Boolean polynomial set S(f, s) as follows. If t ≤ s, then
S(f, s) = {f} and Uf = ∅. Otherwise, let
S(f, s) = {fˇ1, . . . , fˇSt+1} ⊂ R2[X,Uf ] (12)
where fˇ1 =
∑s−1
k=1mk + u1, fˇj =
∑j(s−2)+1
k=(j−1)(s−2)+2mk + uj−1 + uj for j = 2, . . . , St, and fˇSt+1 =∑t
k=St(s−2)+2mk + uSt . S(f, s) is called the splitting set for f .
For convenience of presentation, in this paper, we give new meaning to the notation: ⌈e⌉ = 0
if e ≤ 0. With this assumption, #Uf = ⌈ t−ss−2⌉ and #S(f, s) = ⌈ t−ss−2⌉+ 1.
For a set F of Boolean polynomials, denote U(F , s) = ⋃f∈F U(f, s), and
S(F , s) =
⋃
f∈F
S(f, s) ⊂ R2[X,U(F , s)]. (13)
The following results are easy to check.
Lemma 5.3. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ R2[X] and ti = #fi. Then S(F , s) is s-sparse, #S(F , s) =
r +
∑
i⌈ ti−ss−2 ⌉, #(X ∪ U(F , s)) = n+
∑
i⌈ ti−ss−2 ⌉.
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Lemma 5.4. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ R2[X]. For a given s ∈ N≥3, we have
(S(F , s))
⋂
R2[X] = (F), ProjXVF2(S(F , s)) = VF2(F),
where (S(F , s)) is the ideal generated by S(F , s) in R2[X,U(F , s)].
We summarize the results of this subsection as the following theorem which follows from
Lemmas 5.3 and 5.2.
Theorem 5.5. Let F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ R2[X] with ti = #fi and di = deg(fi). For a given
s ∈ N≥3, let Y = X ∪ U(F , s). Then we have a polynomial set
P (F , s) = C(S(F , s)) ⊂ C[Y]
such that VF2(F) = ProjXVB(P (F , s)). Furthermore, P (F , s) is s(s+1)⌊s/2⌋-sparse, #P (F , s) =
r +
∑
i⌈ ti−ss−2 ⌉, #Y = n+
∑
i⌈ ti−ss−2 ⌉.
In our algorithm, we use s = 3. For a Boolean polynomial f with #f ≤ 3, we give the
following improved version of C(f).
Ĉ(f) =

f, if #f = 1;
n1 − n2, if #f = 2 and f = n1 + n2;
f − 2, if #f = 3 and f(0) = 1;
2m1m2 + 2m1m3 + 2m2m3 − f if #f = 3 and f(0) = 0,
(14)
where f = m1 +m2 +m3 in the case #f = 3. For this new Ĉ(f), we have
Corollary 5.6. For s = 3, VF2(F) = ProjXVB(P (F , s)). Furthermore, P (F , 3) is 6-sparse,
#P (F , 3) ≤ TF , #Y ≤ TF + n.
Proof. We need only to show the last case in (14) and other results are easy to verify. Since we
consider Boolean solutions, we may setm2 = m for any monomial m. Then, C(fi) = fi(fi−2) =
m2i1− 2mi1+m2i2− 2mi2+m2i3− 2mi3+2mi1mi2+2mi1mi3+2mi2mi3 = 2mi1mi2+2mi1mi3+
2mi2m3 −mi1 −mi2 −mi3 (mod HY) = Ĉ(fi)(mod HY), and Ĉ(fi) is 6-sparse.
If ti ≥ 3 for all i, by Lemma 5.3, we have #S(F , 3) = TF−2r and #(X∪U(F , 3)) = n+TF−3r,
where TF =
∑
i ti. Then, #P (F , 3) = TF − 2r ≤ TF , #Y = TF + n − 3r ≤ TF + n. If ti < 3,
then S(fi, 3) = fi and U(fi, 3) = ∅. Hence the bounds are still true.
5.2 Quantum algorithm for Boolean equation solving
In this subsection, we will give a quantum algorithm to solve Boolean equations.
Algorithm 5.7.
Input: F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ R2[X] and ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Output: A zero of F or ∅ meaning that VF2(F) = ∅ with probability > 1− ǫ.
Step 1: Compute F1 = S(F , 3) ⊂ R2[Y] as defined in (13), where Y = X ∪ U(F , 3).
Step 2: Compute F2 = Ĉ(F1) ⊂ C[Y] as defined in (14).
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Step 3: Use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution of F2 = 0 over C[Y], with the probability
bound ǫ. Return ∅ if Algorithm 4.2 returns ∅, else we have a Boolean solution a for F2.
Step 4: Return ProjXa.
Theorem 5.8. Algorithm 5.7 has the following properties.
• If the algorithm returns a solution, then it is a solution of F = 0. Equivalently, if VF2(F) =
∅, the algorithm returns ∅.
• If VF2(F) 6= ∅, the algorithm computes a solution of F = 0 with probability > 1− ǫ.
• The runtime complexity is O˜((n3.5 + T 3.5F )κ2 log 1/ǫ), where TF =
∑
i#fi and κ is the
condition number of the polynomial system F2, called the condition number of the Booolean
system F .
Proof. In Step 2, we split F to 3-sparse polynomials and then turn them into a polynomial
system over C in time O(TF ). By Corollary 5.6, VF2(F) = VB(F2). Thus, we need only to find
Boolean solutions for F2 in Step 3.
If we use F1 = S(F , s) instead of F1 = S(F , 3) in Step 1, by Theorems 4.3 and 5.5, the com-
plexity of Step 3 is O˜((n+
∑
i⌈ ti−ss−2 ⌉)2.5((n+
∑
i⌈ ti−ss−2 ⌉)+(r+
∑
i⌈ ti−ss−2 ⌉))s(s+1)⌊s/2⌋)κ2 log 1/ǫ) =
(n+ TF/s)2.5(n+ TFss/2)κ2 log 1/ǫ). To minimize this complexity, we choose s = 3, meanwhile
the complexity is O˜((n+ TF )2.5(n+ TF )κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜((n3.5 + T 3.5F )κ
2 log 1/ǫ).
Remark 5.9. Algorithm 5.7 has complexity O˜((n4.5 + T 4.5F )κ log 1/ǫ) if using Ambainis’ algo-
rithm [2] to solve the Macualay linear systems.
The following theorem gives the exact complexity for solving Boolean equations, which will
be used in Section 6.
Theorem 5.10. Let F = ⋃ts=1{fs1, . . . , fsrs} ⊂ R2[X] be a Boolean equation system such that
s = #fsj, TF =
∑t
s=1 srs, r =
∑t
s=1 rs. Then we can find a solution of F = 0 with runtime√
2c((n + TF − 3r + 2r1 + r2) log2(6(n + TF − 3r + 2r1 + r2) + 1) + log2(TF − 2r + 2r1 + r2 +
1))(n+TF −3r+2r1+r2)1.5((n+TF−3r+2r1+r2)+1+(6TF −12r+7r1+2r2))κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤√
2c(log2(n + TF ) + 3)(n + TF )2.5(n + 7TF )κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉, where c is the complexity constant of
the HHL algorithm defined in Remark 2.4.
Proof. We use Ĉ(f) defined in (14). By Corollary 5.6, C(S(F , 3)) consists of r1 monomials, r2
binomials, and
∑t
s=3((s− 2)rs) = TF − 2r + r1 polynomials of sparseness 6, and the number of
indeterminates is n+
∑t
s=3((s − 3)rs) = n+ TF − 3r + 2r1 + r2. Thus the total sparseness for
P = C(S(F , 3)) is TP = r1+2r2+6(TF − 2r+ r1) = 6TF − 12r+7r1+2r2. By Lemma 4.7, the
exact complexity for Algorithm 5.7 to find a solution is
√
2c((n+ TF − 3r+2r1+ r2) log2(6(n+
TF−3r+2r1+r2)+1)+log2(TF−2r+2r1+r2+1))(n+TF−3r+2r1+r2)1.5((n+TF−3r+2r1+
r2)+1+(6TF −12r+7r1+2r2))κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤
√
2c((n+TF ) log2(6(n+TF )+1)+log2(TF ))(n+
TF )1.5((n+TF )+6TF )κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤
√
2c(log2(n+TF )+3)(n+TF )2.5(n+7TF )κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉.
5.3 Application to 3-satisfiability problem
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be Boolean indeterminates. A 3-SAT problem is to check the satisfiability
of the propositional logic formula yi1 ∨ yi2 ∨ yi3 = 1 for i = 1, . . . , r, where yij = xk or ¬xk
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for some k. Decision of 3-SAT is NPC. The 3-SAT problem is equivalent to solve the Boolean
equation system
F = {y¯i1y¯i2y¯i3 : i = 1, . . . , r} ∪ {xk + x¯k + 1 : k = 1, . . . , n}}
in R2[X,X], where X = {x¯1, . . . , x¯n}.
Proposition 5.11. For a 3-SAT with r clauses, there is a quantum algorithm to decide its
satisfiability with probability ≥ 1− ǫ and with complexity O˜((n2.5(n+ r)κ2 log 1/ǫ).
Proof. It is easy to see that solving the Boolean system F is equivalent to find the Boolean
solutions for the following polynomial system in C[X,X],
F1 = {y¯i1y¯i2y¯i3 : i = 1, . . . , r} ∪ {xk + x¯k − 1 : k = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {x2k − xk : k = 1, . . . , n},
that is, the 3-SAT problem is satisfiable if and only if VC(F) 6= ∅. Also note that x+ x¯− 1 = 0
and x2 − x = 0 imply x¯2 − x¯ = 0. F1 consists of n binomials, n trinomials and r monomials.
Thus TF1 = 5n+ r, by Lemma 4.7, we can use Algorithm 4.2 to find a Boolean solution in time
O˜(n2.5(n+ 5n+ r)κ2 log 1/ǫ) = O˜(n2.5(n+ r)κ2 log 1/ǫ).
The best classic probabilistic algorithm for 3-SAT was 1.334n given in [30]. In order for our
quantum algorithm to perform better n should be ≥ 64, if κ is not too big.
6 Solving Boolean quadratic equations and cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis of stream ciphers, block ciphers, certain hash functions, and MPKC can be re-
duced to the solving of Boolean multivariate quadratic equations (BMQ). In this section, we
will apply our quantum algorithm to the analysis of these cryptosystems.
6.1 Quantum algebraic attack against AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also known by its original name Rijndael, is a
specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the U.S. National Institute of
Standards and Technology in 2001 [16].
Murphy and Robshaw [28] proposed a method to construct a Boolean equation system,
solving of which consists of an algebraic attack against AES. We will use this approach to
establish a BMQ.
Denote the 32-bit key length of AES as Nk and the number of rounds as Nr. Denote
p, c ∈ F4Nk×82 as the plaintext and the ciphertext of AES, w0 ∈ F4Nk×82 as the key of AES,
wi ∈ F4Nk×82 as the expanded key of AES, w¯i ∈ F4Nk×82 as the image of wi under the S-box map
in the key expansion step, xi ∈ F4Nk×82 as the state after the AddRoundKey step of AES, and
yi ∈ F4Nk×82 as the state after the InvSubBytes step of AES, where xi(j,m) means the m-th bit
at the j-th word of state x for round i. In the key expansion step, several states w¯i are obtained
as the image of wi under the S-box. Then, an algebraic attack on the Nr-rounds AES with key
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length Nk is to solve the following BMQ, denoted as AES-(Nk, Nr):
0 = x0(j,m) + p(j,m) + w0(j,m);
0 = xi(j,m) + wi(j,m) +
∑
j′,m′
α(j,m, j′,m′)yi−1(j′,m′) for i = 1, · · · , Nr − 1;
0 = c(j,m) + wNr(j,m) + yNr−1(5j mod 16,m);
0 = S(xi(j, 0), . . . , xi(j, 7), yi(j, 0), . . . , yi(j, 7)) for i = 0, · · · , Nr − 1;
0 = S(wi(j¯, 0), . . . , wi(j¯, 7), w¯i(j¯, 0), . . . , w¯i(j¯, 7)) for j¯ = 4Nk − 4, . . . , 4Nk − 1;
0 = wi(j¯,m) + wi−1(j¯,m) + w¯i−1(j¯ + 13,m) + χ(m, i) for j¯ = 0, 1, 2;
0 = wi(3,m) + wi−1(3,m) + w¯i−1(12,m) + χ(m, i).
For Nk ≤ 6 :
0 = wi(j¯,m) + wi−1(j¯,m) + wi(j¯ − 4,m) for j¯ = 4, . . . , 4Nk − 1.
For Nk > 6 :
0 = S(wi(j¯, 0), . . . , wi(j¯, 7), w¯i(j¯, 0), . . . , w¯i(j¯, 7)) for j¯ = 12, . . . , 15;
0 = wi(j¯,m) + wi−1(j¯,m) + w¯i(j¯ − 4,m) for j¯ = 16, . . . , 19;
0 = wi(j¯,m) + wi−1(j¯,m) + wi(j¯ − 4,m) for j¯ = 4, . . . , 15, 20, . . . , 4Nk − 1,
where j runs from 0 to (4Nk − 1), and m runs from 0 to 7. w¯i(j,m), xi(j,m), and yi(j,m)
are state variables, wi(j,m) are key variables, S is a set of 39 BMQ in F2[x0, . . . , x7, y0, . . . , y7]
representing the Rijndael S-box, which can be found in the Appendix of this paper. χ is the
round constant. Thus x, y, w and w¯ are Boolean indeterminates and other alphabets are known
constants. In the second group of equations, exactly 640 of α(j,m, j′,m′) are 1 for a given i.
The equation set S of the S-box is given in the Appendix (Section 8), which can be simplified
as follows. The original S is a BMQ with total sparseness 1688. By doing Gaussian elimination,
we obtain a BMQ S with with total sparseness 1192. We can introduce 1075 new indetermi-
nates uij to split S into 3-sparse BMQ. Thus P (S, 3) consists of 1331 quadratic binomials, 115
quadratic polynomials, 989 cubic polynomials, and 10 quartic polynomials over C.
Totally, the AES-(Nk, Nr) can be represented by a BMQ with number of indeterminates n =
96NkNr+32Nk+32Nr (ifNk ≤ 6) or n = 96NkNr+32Nk+64Nr (ifNk > 6), number of equations
r = 220NrNk+64Nk+156Nr (if Nk ≤ 6) or r = 220NrNk+64Nk+312Nr (if Nk > 6), and total
sparseness T = 4928NrNk +192Nk +5440Nr (if Nk ≤ 6) or T = 4928NrNk +192Nk +10208Nr
(if Nk > 6). By Theorem 5.10, we have
Proposition 6.1. There is a quantum algorithm to obtain a solution of AES-(Nk, Nr) with com-
plexity
√
2(log2(5024NkNr+224Nk+5472Nr)+3)(5024NkNr+224Nk+5472Nr)
2.5(34592NkNr+
1376Nk + 38112Nr)cκ
2 log2 1/ǫ (if Nk ≤ 6), or
√
2(log2(5024NkNr + 224Nk + 10272Nr) +
3)(5024NkNr + 224Nk + 10272Nr)
2.5(34592NkNr + 1376Nk + 71520Nr)cκ
2 log2 1/ǫ (if Nk > 6)
with probability > 1− ǫ, where κ is the condition number of F and c is the complexity constant
of the HHL algorithm.
Set Nk = 4, 6, 8, Nr = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and ǫ = 1%. We have the following complexities on
quantum algebraic attack on various AESes. From Table 2, we can see that AES is secure under
quantum algebraic attack only if the condition number κ is large.
6.2 Quantum algebraic attack against Trivium
Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher designed by Cannie´re and Preneel [8] in 2005 to provide
a flexible trade-off between speed and gate count in hardware, and reasonably efficient software
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AES Nk Nr #Vars #Eqs T-Sparseness Complexity
AES-128 4 4 1792 4400 101376 268.61cκ2
AES-128 4 6 2624 6472 151680 270.68cκ2
AES-128 4 8 3456 8544 201984 272.16cκ2
AES-128 4 10 4288 10616 252288 273.30cκ2
AES-192 6 12 7488 18096 421248 276.59cκ2
AES-256 8 14 11904 29520 696384 278.53cκ2
Table 2: Complexities of the quantum algebraic attack on AES
implementation, which has been specified as an International Standard under ISO/IEC 29192-3.
Trivium can be represented by the following nonlinear feedback shift registers (NFSR) which
can also be considered as BMQ [35] F :
A(t+ 93) = A(t+ 24) + C(t+ 45) + C(t) + C(t+ 1)C(t+ 2), 0 ≤ t ≤ Nr − 67;
B(t+ 84) = B(t+ 6) +A(t+ 27) +A(t) +A(t+ 1)A2(t+ 2), 0 ≤ t ≤ Nr − 70; (15)
C(t+ 111) = C(t+ 24) +B(t+ 15) +B(t) +B(t+ 1)B(t+ 2), 0 ≤ t ≤ Nr − 67;
z(t) = A(t+ 27) +A(t) +B(t+ 15) +B(t) + C(t+ 45) + C(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ Nr − 1,
where A,B,C are state variables and z is the output. For an initial state Z0 = (A(0), . . . , A(92),
B(0), . . . , B(83), C(0), . . . , C(110)) ∈ F2882 , we can generate the key sequence z(0), z(1), . . . , z(Nr
−1) with the above NFSR. Thus, for the Nr-round Trivium, F consists of (3Nr−201) quadratic
polynomials of sparseness 5, and Nr linear polynomials of sparseness 7, and with (3Nr + 87)
indeterminates. Thus, T = 5(3Nr − 201) + 7Nr = 22Nr − 1005.
The algebraic attach on the Nr-round Trivium is to solve the BMQ (15), where z(0), z(1), . . .,
z(Nr − 1) are constants. It is generally believed that for Nr > 288, (15) has a unique solution.
Proposition 6.2. There is a quantum algorithm to find a solution for the Nr-round Trivium
equation system in time 220.46 log2(Nr)N
3.5
r cκ
2 log 1/ǫ with probability > 1 − ǫ, where κ is the
condition number of F and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Proof. By Theorem 5.10, the complexity is
√
2c(log2((3Nr+87)+(22Nr−1005))+3)((3Nr+87)+
(22Nr − 1005))2.5((3Nr + 87) + 7(22Nr − 1005))κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ =
√
2c log2(200Nr − 7344)(25Nr −
918)2.5(157Nr − 6948)κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤ 220.46 log2(Nr)N3.5r cκ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉.
In Table 3, we give the complexities for several Nr assuming ǫ = 1%. From Table 3, we can
see that Trivium is secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition number κ is
large.
Round #Vars #Eqs T-Sparseness Complexity
288 951 951 5331 253.96cκ2
576 1815 2103 11667 257.94cκ2
1152 3543 4407 24339 261.71cκ2
2304 6999 9015 49683 265.38cκ2
Table 3: Complexities of the quantum algebraic attack on Trivium
6.3 Quantum algebraic attack against Keccak
Keccak [6], the winner of SHA-3 contest, is the latest member of the Secure Hash Algorithm
family of standards, released by NIST on August 5, 2015. For Keccak-[Nh, b,Nr], we denote
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Nh, b, and Nr as the output bit size, the state bit size, and the number of rounds. Let A0(x, y, z)
be the message, Ai(x, y, z) be the state variable after applying the τ function for i-times, and
Bi(x, y, z) be the state variable after applying the π function for i-times, where x, y ∈ Z/5Z,
z ∈ Z/wZ, and w = b/25 = 1, 2, 4, . . . , 64 is the bit length of each word. Then for Keccak-
[Nh, b,Nr], we have the following BMQ F [36]:
Bi(3y + x, x, z − r(3y + x, x)) = Ai−1(x, y, z) +
4∑
j=0
Ai−1(x− 1, j, z) +
4∑
j=0
Ai−1(x+ 1, j, z − 1);
Ai(x, y, z) = Bi(x, y, z) + (1−Bi(x+ 1, y, z))Bi(x+ 2, y, z), for x 6= 0 or y 6= 0;
Ai(0, 0, z) = Bi(0, 0, z) + (1−Bi(1, 0, z))Bi(2, 0, z) +RC(z)
for i = 1, . . . , Nr, x, y = 0, . . . , 4, z = 0, . . . , w. In the preimage attack on Keccak, r(3y + x, x)
and RC(z) are known constants, the first Nb of ANr(x, y, z) are the known Hash output, and
Ai(x, y, z) (i < Nr) and Bi(x, y, z) are indeterminates. Thus we have n = 2bNr indeterminates
and r = (2b − 1)Nr + Nh Boolean quadratic equations with total sparseness T = 401Nrw +
101Nh/25− 101w.
Proposition 6.3. For the BMQ Keccak-[Nh, b,Nr], there is a quantum algorithm to find a
preimage in time 2
√
2c log2(401Nrw+26Nh/25)(401Nrw+26Nh/25)
2.5(3609Nrw+384Nh/25)κ
2
⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤ 218.83 log2(Nrb)N3.5r b3.5cκ2 ⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ with probability > 1− ǫ, where κ is the condi-
tion number of F and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Proof. We have n = 2bNr, r = (2b−1)Nr+Nh, and T = 401Nrw+101Nh/25−101w. By Theo-
rem 5.10, the complexity is
√
2c(log2(2bNr+(401Nrw+101Nh/25−101w))+3)(2bNr+(401Nrw+
101Nh/25−101w))2.5(2bNr+7(401Nrw+101Nh/25−101w))κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤
√
2c log2(3608Nrw+
808Nh/25)(451Nrw+101Nh/25)
2.5(2857Nrw+707Nh/25)κ
2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ ≤ 218.83 log2(Nrb)N3.5r b3.5
cκ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉.
Setting Nh = 224, 256, 384, 512, Nr = 24, b = 1600 and ǫ = 1%, the complexities for various
(Nh, b,Nr) are given in Table 4. From Table 4, we can see that Keccak is secure under quantum
algebraic attack only if the condition number κ is large.
Nh b Nr #Vars #Eqs T-Sparseness Complexity
224 1600 24 76800 77000 610377 278.25cκ2
256 1600 24 76800 77032 610506 278.25cκ2
384 1600 24 76800 77160 611023 278.25cκ2
512 1600 24 76800 77288 611540 278.25cκ2
Table 4: Complexities of the quantum preimage attack on Keccak
The best known traditional attacks on Keccak were given in [34] and [24]. In [34], practical
collision attacks against the 5-round Keccak-224 and an instance of the 6-round Keccak collision
challenge were given. In [24], key recovery attacks were given for 4- to 8-round Keccak.
6.4 Quantum algebraic attack against MPKC
Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem (MPKC) is one of the candidates for post-quantum
cryptography [17]. An MPKC is generally constructed as follows
H = L ◦G ◦R = (h1(X), . . . , hr(X)) (16)
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where L ∈ GL(m,F2), R ∈ GL(n,F2), and G : Fn2 → Fm2 is a quadratic map whose inversion
can be efficiently computed. L and R are the secret keys and H is the public map. The direct
algebraic attack against the MPKC is to solve the BMQ:
y1 = h1(X), . . . , yr = hr(X) (17)
where X = (x1, . . . , xn) is the plaintext and Y = (y1, . . . , yr) is the known ciphertext. Note that
the BMQ in (17) are dense. We have
Proposition 6.4. For dense BMQ F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ R2[X], there is a quantum algorithm to
obtain a solution in time
√
2c(log2(n+(n
2+3n−4)r/2)+3)(n+(n2+3n−4)r/2)2.5(n+7(n2+
3n− 4)r/2)κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ = O˜(n7r3.5κ2 log 1/ǫ) with probability > 1− ǫ, where κ is the condition
number of F and c is the complexity constant of the HHL algorithm.
Proof. If F is a dense BMQ, T = (n + 1)(n + 2)r/2. By Theorem 5.10, we can find a solution
of F = 0 in time √2c(log2(n+ (n2 + 3n− 4)r/2) + 3)(n+ (n2 + 3n− 4)r/2)2.5(n+ 7(n2 + 3n−
4)r/2)κ2⌈log2 1/ǫ⌉ = O˜(n7r3.5κ2 log 1/ǫ).
Corollary 6.5. Suppose r = γn. Then there is a quantum algebraic attack against MPKC in
time O˜(γn10.5κ2 log 1/ǫ) with probability > 1− ǫ, where κ is the condition number of (17).
Related to this problem, the BMQ Challenge is to solve a given random BMQ withm = 2n or
n = 1.5m over the finite fields F2, F28 [37]. Considering the field F28 = F2[α]/(α
8+α4+α3+α+1),
each variable x over F28 is a sum of eight Boolean variables, that is x =
∑7
i=0 xiα
i. Then
F = {f1, . . . , fr} ⊂ F28 [x1, . . . , xn] can be rewritten as F1 = {f11, . . . , f18, f21, . . . , fm8} ⊂
R2[x11, . . . , x18, x21, . . . , xn8], where xij and fij denote the j-th bit of xi and fi. As a conse-
quence, equation solving over F28 has the same complexity as Boolean equation solving. For
the BMQ challenge [37], m = 2n or n = 1.5m implies the complexity is O˜(T 3.5κ2 log 1/ǫ) <
O˜(n10.5κ2 log 1/ǫ).
The best known deterministic algebraic algorithms to solve the BMQ are the Gro¨bner basis
method [3] which has complexity O(20.841n) under certain regularity condition for the equation
system, and the multiplication free characteristic set method [20] which has bit complexity O(2n)
for general BMQ. Although exponential in n, these methods had been used to solve BMQ from
cryptanalysis with n = 128.
Remark 6.6. From the above discussion, we can see that AES, Trivium, Keccak, and MPKC
are secure under quantum algebraic attack only if the condition numbers of the related Boolean
equation systems are large. This suggests that a possible new quantum criterion for cryptosystem
design: the Boolean equation system of the cryptosystem has a large condition number.
7 Conclusion
We give two quantum algorithms to find the Boolean solutions of a polynomial system in C[X]
and to solve Boolean equations in R2[X] in any given probability, whose complexities are poly-
nomial in the number of variables, the total sparseness of the equation system, and the condition
number of the equation system. As a consequence, we achieved exponential speedup for sparse
Boolean equation solving if the condition number of the equation system is small.
The main idea of the algorithm is first reducing the problem of Boolean equation solving to
the problem of finding the Boolean solutions of a polynomial system over C and then solving
the Macaulay linear system of the polynomial system over C with the modified HHL algorithm
to obtain the Boolean solutions based on the properties of quantum states.
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The new quantum algorithm is used to give quantum algebraic attack against major cryp-
tosystems AES, Trivium, and SHA-3/Keccak and show that these ciphers are secure under
quantum algebraic attack only if the condition numbers of their equation systems are large.
Similar results hold for MPKC, which is a candidate for post-quantum cryptosystems.
We also use the quantum algorithms to three famous problems from computational theory:
the 3-SAT problem, the graph isomorphism problem, and the subset sum problem and show
that the complexities to solve these problems are polynomial in the input size and the condition
number of their corresponding equation system.
One of the major problems for future study is on the condition number: either to estimate
the condition number of the cryptosystems and the 3-SAT problem, or to find new quantum
method to solve Boolean systems, which has less relation with the condition number. It is also
interesting to extend the method proposed in this paper to more general equation systems, such
as equation solving over the finite fields [10] or the field of complex numbers.
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8 Appendix. Equations for the AES S-Box
We list the 39 Boolean quadratic polynomials for the AES S-Box used in this paper.
x5x7+x5x6+x3x7+x3x6+x2x4+x1x7+x1x6+x1x5+x1x3+x1x2+x0x7+x0x3+x0x2+
x6y7 + x7y6 + x6y6 + x7y5 + x5y5 + x7y4 + x1y4 + x2y3 + x0y3 + x6y2 + x4y2 + x3y2 + x0y2 +
x4y0 + x2y0 + x7 + x5 + x3 + y7 + y2 + y0 + 1,
x6x7+x5x7+x4x7+x4x6+x4x5+x3x4+x2x5+x1x7+x1x6+x1x5+x1x4+x1x3+x1x2+
x0x5+x0x1+x6y6+ y5y7+x3y4+ y4y7+ y4y5+x5y3+x0y3+ y3y6+ y3y4+x3y2+x0y2+ y2y4+
y2y3 + x5y0 + x3y0 + x1y0 + y0y7 + y0y3 + y0y1 + x5 + x3 + x0 + y2 + 1,
x1y7+x0y7+y6y7+x7y5+x6y5+y5y7+x7y4+x5y3+x2y3+y3y6+x2y2+x0y2+y2y5+x6y1+
x4y1+x1y1+y1y2+x6y0+x5y0+x4y0+y0y7+y0y6+y0y5+y0y4+y0y3+x3+x1+y3+y2+y1+1,
x6x7+x4x6+ x3x7+x2x7+ x1x4+x0x6+ x0x3+x6y7+x4y7+x3y7+x7y6+x3y6+x7y5+
x7y4 + x1y4 + x5y3 + x4y3 + x1y3 + x6y2 + x2y2 + x6y1 + x5y1 + x3y1 + x1y1 + x0y1 + x7y0 +
x6y0 + x5y0 + x3y0 + x2y0 + x1y0 + x6 + x1,
x6y7 + x5y7 + x1y7 + x0y7+ x5y6 + x4y6 + x3y6 + x4y4 + x3y4+ x2y4 + x4y3 + x3y3 + y3y5+
x2y2+ y2y7+ y2y4+ y2y3+x7y1+x4y1+x3y1+x1y1+ y1y7+ y1y6+ y1y5+ y1y2+x7y0+x5y0+
x4y0 + x3y0 + y0y4 + y0y3 + y0y2 + x6 + x4 + x3 + y2,
x2y7 + y5y6 + x1y4 + x7y3 + x2y3 + x1y3 + x0y3 + y3y6 + y3y4 + x4y2 + x2y2 + x0y2 + y2y6 +
y2y5+ y2y3+x5y1+x3y1+ y1y7+ y1y5+ y1y4+ y1y3+ y1y2+x5y0+x4y0+x3y0+x0y0+ y0y6+
y0y1 + x7 + x6 + x3 + x2 + x1 + y4 + y2 + y1 + y0,
x5y7 + x3y6 + x2y6 + x0y6+ x6y5 + x5y5 + x0y5 + x6y4 + x5y4+ x3y4 + x2y4 + x0y4 + y4y7+
y3y6+ y3y5+x3y2+x2y2+x0y2+ y2y7+ y2y6+ y2y5+x3y1+x2y1+ y1y7+ y1y6+ y1y3+x5y0+
x4y0 + x1y0 + y0y7 + y0y2 + x6 + x1 + y4 + y3 + y1,
x6y7 + x3y7 + x0y7+ x2y6+ x4y4 + x2y4 + x0y4 + x7y3+ x6y3+ x3y3 + x2y3 + x1y3+ x0y3+
x5y2 + x2y2 + x1y2 + x3y1 + x2y1 + x1y1 + x3y0 + x6 + x2 + x1 + x0 + y2,
x7y7 + x4y7 + x1y7 + x7y6+ x6y6 + x1y6 + y6y7+ x7y5 + x6y5 + x2y5 + x0y5 + x6y4 + x4y4+
x2y4+ y4y5+x4y3+x3y3+x2y3+x1y3+x0y3+ y3y6+ y3y5+x3y2+ y2y4+x6y1+x5y1+x4y1+
y1y5 + y1y2 + x6y0 + x2y0 + x1y0 + y0y6 + y4 + y3,
x4y7 + x3y7 + x4y6+ x2y6+ x1y6 + x0y4 + x3y3 + x1y3+ x0y3+ x7y2 + x3y2 + x2y2+ x1y2+
x0y2 + x7y1 + x6y1 + x5y1 + x4y1 + x3y1 + x0y1 + x4 + x2 + x1 + y2,
x3x6+ x2x5+ x1x4+ x1x2+ x0x4+x0x1+x4y6+ x2y6+x1y6+x7y5+ x7y4+ x2y4+x6y3+
x4y3+x3y3+x2y3+x7y2+x0y2+x4y1+x3y1+x5y0+x2y0+x1y0+x4+x1+ y4+ y3+ y0+1,
x4x7+x2x3+x1x5+x1x4+x0x7+x0x6+x0x5+x0x4+x0x1+x7y7+x4y7+x1y6+x2y4+
x1y4 + x0y4 + x7y3 + x4y3 + x3y3 + x4y2 + x3y2 + x0y2 + x7y1 + x5y1 + x2y1 + x1y1 + x0y1 +
x1y0 + x0y0 + x7 + x1 + x0 + y2,
x6x7+x4x5+x3x7+x3x5+x2x5+x2x4+x2x3+x1x7+x0x6+x0x4+x2y7+x0y7+x1y6+
x6y5 + x2y4 + x6y3 + x5y3 + x2y3 + x6y2 + x4y2 + x3y2 + x2y2 + x1y2 + x7y1 + x5y1 + x6y0 +
x5y0 + x4y0 + x3y0 + x0y0,
x5x7+ x3x6+ x1x7+ x1x2+ x0x4+x0x3+x1y7+ x2y6+x1y6+x6y5+ x4y5+ x2y5+x0y4+
x5y3 + x2y3 + x6y2 + x5y2 + x1y2 + x0y2 + x7y1 + x6y0 + x5y0 + x0y0 + x6 + x1 + y6 + y2 + y1,
x1y7 + x0y7 + x2y6+ x6y5+ x2y5 + x4y4 + x3y4 + x2y4+ x1y4+ x0y4 + x5y3 + x2y3+ x1y3+
x7y2 + x4y2 + x3y2 + x1y2 + x6y1 + x3y1 + x2y1 + x1y1 + x0y1 + x5y0 + x0y0 + x3 + y2,
x5x7+ x3x6+ x1x7+ x1x2+ x0x4+x0x3+x6y7+ x3y7+x0y7+x4y6+ x5y5+ x2y5+x4y4+
x3y3+x1y2+x0y2+x7y1+x5y1+x4y1+x2y1+x7y0+x6y0+x1y0+x6+x5+x4+x2+x0+ y7,
x7y7 + x7y6 + x6y6 + x4y6+ x2y6 + x1y6 + x7y5 + x2y5 + x7y4+ x1y4 + x0y4 + y4y6 + x7y3+
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x3y3+ y3y5+ y3y4+x7y2+x4y2+x3y2+ y2y4+ y2y3+ y1y6+x3y0+x2y0+x1y0+ y0y6+ y0y4+
y0y2 + y0y1 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x1 + y4 + y2 + y1,
x7y6 + y6y7 + x7y5 + x3y5 + y5y7 + x7y4 + x0y4 + y4y7 + y4y5 + x6y3 + x4y3 + x3y3 + x1y3 +
y3y7+ y3y6+ y3y5+ y3y4+x6y2+x5y2+x4y2+x1y2+x0y2+ y2y5+x6y1+x5y1+x4y1+x0y1+
y1y7 + y1y4 + y1y2 + x5y0 + x4y0 + y0y7 + y0y5 + y0y4 + x0 + y0,
x6y6 + x1y6 + x5y5+ x3y4+ x0y4 + x7y3 + x6y3 + x5y3+ x1y3+ x0y3 + x7y2 + x7y1+ x6y1+
x4y1 + x3y1 + x0y1 + x4y0 + x2y0 + x7 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x0 + y2,
x6x7+x5x7+x4x6+x3x7+x2x7+x2x5+x1x7+x0x6+x0x1+x7y7+x3y7+x1y7+x5y6+x0y4+
x6y3+x1y3+x7y2+x6y2+x5y2+x4y2+x3y2+x4y1+x2y1+x5y0+x3y0+x5+x2+x1+x0+y3+y2,
x0y7 + x2y6 + x0y6+ x5y5+ x0y5 + x6y4 + x3y4 + x2y4+ x0y4+ x7y3 + x6y3 + x4y3+ x3y3+
x2y3 + x4y2 + x3y2 + x4y1 + x2y1 + x7y0 + x2y0 + x0y0 + x7 + x4 + x2 + x1 + y4 + y1 + y0,
x5x7+x5x6+x4x6+x3x5+x2x6+x2x5+x1x7+x1x6+x0x7+x0x6+x0x3+x0x1+x6y7+x3y6+
x3y4+x0y4+x7y3+x4y3+x3y3+x5y2+x4y2+x6y1+x4y1+x2y1+x1y1+x1y0+x5+x0+y4+y2,
x5x7+x5x6+x3x7+x3x4+x2x6+x2x4+x1x4+x1x3+x1x2+x0x6+x7y7+x6y7+x4y7+
x3y7 + x1y6 + x1y4 + x7y3 + x3y3 + x2y3 + x6y2 + x2y2 + x0y2 + x7y1 + x5y1 + x4y1 + x3y1 +
x6y0 + x3y0 + x1y0 + x6 + x3 + x2 + y4,
x5x7+x4x6+x4x5+x3x5+x2x7+x2x4+x2x3+x0x4+x0x1+x4y6+x2y6+x7y5+x7y4+
x6y4 + x1y4 + x6y3 + x5y3 + x2y3 + x1y3 + x7y2 + x5y2 + x7y1 + x6y1 + x0y1 + x4y0 + x3y0 +
x1y0 + x3 + x1 + y4 + y3,
x5x7+x4x6+x3x7+x3x5+x3x4+x2x4+x1x6+x1x3+x1x2+x0x7+x4y7+x3y7+x0y7+
x4y6 + x2y6 + x0y6 + x5y5 + x0y5 + x6y4 + x6y3 + x6y2 + x4y2 + x3y2 + x1y2 + x5y1 + x4y1 +
x5y0 + x1y0 + x0y0 + x7 + x5 + y1 + y0,
x6x7+x4x6+x4x5+x2x6+x2x5+x2x3+x1x7+x1x5+x1x4+x1x3+x0x2+x1y7+x2y6+x1y6+
x6y5+x2y5+x2y4+x3y3+x7y2+x3y2+x2y2+x7y1+x5y1+x1y1+x7+x3+x0+y6+y4+y2+y1,
x7y5 + x7y4 + x2y4+ x7y3+ x6y3 + x0y3 + x5y2 + x4y2+ x0y2+ x7y1 + x3y1 + x2y1+ x0y1+
x7y0 + x5y0 + x4y0 + x2y0 + x1y0 + x2 + x1 + x0 + y4 + y2 + y1 + 1,
x5x6+x3x7+x3x6+x2x5+x2x4+x1x6+x1x5+x1x4+x1x3+x1x2+x0x7+x0x2+x0x1+
x5y7 + x1y6 + x4y4 + x2y4 + x0y4 + x5y3 + x4y3 + x1y3 + x0y2 + x5y1 + x2y1 + x1y1 + x3y0 +
x0y0 + x6 + x5 + x1 + y3 + y2,
x6y7 + x3y7 + x1y7+ x6y6+ x5y6 + x1y6 + x5y5 + x1y5+ x6y4+ x6y3 + x5y3 + x4y3+ x3y2+
x7y1 + x6y1 + x1y1 + x6y0 + x3y0 + x2y0 + x5 + y7 + y3 + y2 + y1 + y0,
x5x6+x4x6+x3x6+x3x5+x3x4+x1x7+x1x5+x0x3+x0x2+x5y7+x1y6+x6y5+x2y5+
x2y4 + x0y4 + x6y2 + x4y2 + x2y2 + x1y2 + x6y1 + x5y1 + x4y1 + x2y1 + x5y0 + x3y0 + x7 + x6 +
x4 + x0 + y6 + y4 + y2 + 1,
x5y7 + x4y7 + x3y7+ x1y7+ x0y7 + x7y6 + x4y6 + x7y5+ x3y5+ x7y4 + x4y4 + x3y4+ x7y3+
x6y3+x4y3+x3y3+x1y3+x6y2+x5y2+x2y2+x2y1+x7y0+x3y0+x2y0+x1y0+ y6+ y2+ y0,
x7y7 + x4y7 + x1y7+ x6y6+ x5y6 + x5y5 + x2y3 + x1y3+ x0y3+ x5y2 + x4y2 + x2y2+ x1y2+
x7y1 + x0y1 + x6y0 + x5y0 + x4y0 + x0y0 + x6 + x2 + x1 + x0 + y7,
x7y7 + x4y7 + x2y7+ x4y6+ x6y5 + x5y5 + x1y5 + x6y4+ x4y4+ x7y3 + x6y3 + x6y2+ x5y2+
x0y2 + x6y1 + x2y1 + x6y0 + x4y0 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x1 + x0 + y7 + y4 + y2,
x4x6+x4x5+x3x5+x3x4+x2x7+x2x6+x2x4+x2x3+x1x6+x1x5+x1x4+x1x2+x0x7+
x0x6 + x0x2 + x0x1 + x0y5 + x6y4 + x3y4 + x0y4 + x6y3 + x3y3 + x2y3 + x6y2 + x5y2 + x4y2 +
x0y2 + x7y1 + x5y1 + x0y0 + x7 + y1 + 1,
x6y7 + y6y7 + x7y5 + y5y7 + x7y4 + y4y7 + x7y3 + x6y3 + x2y3 + x1y3 + y3y5 + y3y4 + x7y2 +
x6y2+x0y2+ y2y3+x4y1+x3y1+x2y1+x1y1+x0y1+ y1y5+ y1y2+x7y0+x1y0+ y0y7+ y0y6+
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y0y3 + y0y1 + x2 + y5 + y4,
x4y7 + x3y7 + x1y7+ x5y6+ x4y6 + x1y6 + x4y5 + x0y5+ x7y4+ x6y4 + x4y4 + x2y4+ x1y4+
x5y3 + x4y3 + x3y3 + x0y3 + x3y2 + x0y1 + x6y0 + x1y0 + x6 + x4 + x2 + y6 + y2 + y1,
x5x7+x4x7+x2x5+x2x3+x1x7+x1x5+x0x7+x0x6+x0x5+x0x4+x0x3+x4y5+x6y4+x5y3+
x4y3+x0y3+x7y2+x3y2+x2y2+x5y1+x3y1+x0y1+x5y0+x3y0+x0y0+x7+x5+x1+x0+y4+y0+1,
x7y7 + x4y7 + x0y7+ x6y6+ x5y6 + x0y6 + x0y5 + x6y4+ x5y4+ x3y4 + x7y3 + x6y3+ x0y3+
x7y2 + x3y2 + x2y2 + x6y1 + x3y1 + x1y1 + x5y0 + x4y0 + x3y0 + x1y0 + x3 + y3,
x4x5+x3x7+x3x6+x3x4+x2x7+x2x5+x2x3+x1x6+x1x4+x1x3+x0x7+x1y7+x2y6+x1y6+
x6y5+x2y5+x4y4+x3y4+x7y3+x3y2+x5y1+x2y1+x0y1+x4y0+x3y0+x0y0+x3+y3+y2+y1+y0.
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